===============================================================================
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
---------------
SCHEDULE 14D-1
(AMENDMENT NO. 11)
TENDER OFFER STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(D)(1)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
---------------
AMERICAN BANKERS INSURANCE GROUP, INC.
---------------
(NAME OF SUBJECT COMPANY)
SEASON ACQUISITION CORP.
CENDANT CORPORATION
---------------
(Bidders)
COMMON STOCK, PAR VALUE $1.00 PER SHARE
(INCLUDING THE ASSOCIATED PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE RIGHTS)
---------------
(Title of Class of Securities)
024456 10 5
---------------
(CUSIP Number of Class of Securities)
JAMES E. BUCKMAN, ESQ.
SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL
CENDANT CORPORATION
6 SYLVAN WAY
PARSIPPANY, NEW JERSEY 07054
TELEPHONE: (973) 428-9700
(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person Authorized
to Receive Notices and Communications on Behalf of Bidders)
WITH A COPY TO:
DAVID FOX, ESQ.
ERIC J. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
919 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022
TELEPHONE: (212) 735-3000
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This Amendment No. 11 amends the Tender Offer Statement on Schedule 14D-1
initially filed on January 27, 1998 (as amended, the "Schedule 14D-1") by
Cendant Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("Parent"), and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Season Acquisition Corp., a New Jersey corporation ("Purchaser"),
relating to Purchaser's tender offer for 23,501,260 outstanding shares of
common stock, par value $1.00 per share, of American Bankers Insurance Group,
Inc., a Florida corporation (the "Company"). Unless otherwise defined herein,
all capitalized terms used herein shall have the respective meanings given
such terms in the Schedule 14D-1.
ITEM 10. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
The information set forth in subsection (e) of the Schedule 14D-1 is
hereby amended and supplemented by the following information:
On February 13, 1998, Parent and Purchaser moved to dismiss (the "Parent
Motion to Dismiss") the AIG Complaint filed against them on February 5, 1998
by AIG and AIGF ("Plaintiffs") in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. The Parent Motion to Dismiss is based on
several arguments, including that: the AIG Complaint should be dismissed
because the claims should have been filed as compulsory counterclaims in the
action filed on January 27, 1998 by Parent and Purchaser against the Company,
substantially all of the directors of the Company, AIG and AIGF; Plaintiffs'
claims concerning Parent's and Purchaser's ability to obtain regulatory
approval are moot because Parent and Purchaser have attached Plaintiffs'
complaint as an exhibit to their Schedule 14D-1 thereby disclosing the
existence of AIG's views regarding regulatory approval; Plaintiffs' complaint
fails to state a claim or plead fraud with particularity because the alleged
false statements or omissions were not misleading, and, moreover, all
required disclosures were made; and Plaintiffs' claim that Parent and
Purchaser violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 should be
dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim based on Section
5. Parent and Purchaser believe that Plaintiffs' complaint is meritless, and
will continue to vigorously oppose Plaintiffs' claims.
On February 13, 1998, in connection with Parent's and Purchaser's
application for approval of the acquisition of a controlling interest in
American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, American Bankers Life
Assurance Company of Florida and Voyager Service Warranties, Inc. (the
"Florida Domestic Insurers"), each a subsidiary of the Company (the "Parent
Form A Proceedings") and in connection with the application of AIG and AIGF
for approval of their proposed acquisition of a controlling interest in the
Florida Domestic Insurers (the "AIG Form A Proceedings"), Parent and
Purchaser filed with the Florida Department of Insurance (the "Florida
Department") reply memoranda in further support of (i) Parent's and
Purchaser's motion to consolidate the Parent Form A Proceedings with the AIG
Form A Proceedings (the "Consolidation Motion") and (ii) Parent's and
Purchaser's petition to intervene in the AIG Form A Proceedings, for an order
of the Florida Department consolidating the AIG Form A Proceedings with the
Parent Form A Proceedings, and for a hearing in the AIG Form A Proceedings
(the "Intervention, Consolidation and Hearing Petition"). In these filings,
Parent and Purchaser asserted that AIG's and AIGF's opposition to the
Consolidation Motion and the Intervention, Consolidation and Hearing Petition
was without legal or factual basis, and that the Consolidation Motion and the
Intervention, Consolidation and Hearing Petition were filed in conformity
with, and seek relief available under, all applicable procedural rules.
Parent and Purchaser further asserted that they should be permitted to
intervene in the AIG Form A Proceedings because their substantial interests
as a shareholder (in the case of Parent) and competing acquirer of the
Company will be affected by the AIG Form A Proceedings. Parent and Purchaser
also asserted that the AIG Form A Proceedings raise substantial issues
regarding whether AIG's proposed acquisition of a controlling interest in the
Florida Domestic Insurers should be approved by the Florida Department, that
these issues should receive a thorough and complete review by the Florida
Department, that Parent and Purchaser have a right to be heard on these
issues through participation in the AIG Form A Proceedings and that the
Florida Department would be in error if it did not consolidate the Parent
Form A Proceedings and the AIG Form A Proceedings and hear and decide the two
proceedings simultaneously. Parent and Purchaser also asserted that the
Florida Department should defer any hearing until after the results of the
vote of the Company's shareholders on the Proposed AIG Merger.
2
ITEM 11. MATERIAL TO BE FILED AS EXHIBITS.
Item 11 is hereby amended as follows:
(g)(11) Motion to Dismiss filed on February 13, 1998 by Parent and
Purchaser in response to Complaint filed by AIG and AIGF in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Miami Division.
(g)(12) Parent's and Purchaser's Memorandum of Law in Support of the
Parent Motion to Dismiss (including the exhibits attached
thereto).
(g)(13) Reply Memorandum in further support of Purchaser's Petitions for
Hearing and to Intervene and Consolidate, filed with the Florida
Department of Insurance on February 13, 1998, including the
following exhibits:
Exhibit A: Parent's and Purchaser's Memorandum of Law in Support of
the Parent Motion to Dismiss (included as Exhibit (g)(12)
hereto).
Exhibit B: AIG Complaint (previously filed as Exhibit (g)(10) to the
Schedule 14D-1 and incorporated herein by reference).
Exhibit C: "AIG Becomes New Quackenbush Target," The Insurance
Regulator, p.1 (July 21, 1997).
Exhibit D: "AIG Assails Cendant's Reputation In Battle for American
Bankers," The Wall Street Journal, p.B5 (February 9,
1998).
Exhibit E: Takeover Stock Report, dated February 3, 1998.
(g)(14) Reply Memorandum in further support of Purchaser's Motion to
Consolidate, filed with the Florida Department of Insurance on
February 13, 1998, (exhibits to this Reply Memorandum have been
provided with Exhibit (g)(13) attached hereto).
3
SIGNATURE
After due inquiry and to the best of its knowledge and belief, the
undersigned certifies that the information set forth in this statement is
true, complete and correct.
Dated: February 13, 1998
CENDANT CORPORATION
By: /s/ James E. Buckman
-------------------------------
Name: James E. Buckman
Title: Senior Executive Vice
President
and General Counsel
SEASON ACQUISITION CORP.
By: /s/ James E. Buckman
-------------------------------
Name: James E. Buckman
Title: Executive Vice President
4
EXHIBIT INDEX
EXHIBIT NO.
- -----------
(g)(11) Motion to Dismiss filed on February 13, 1998 by Parent and
Purchaser in response to Complaint filed by AIG and AIGF in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Miami Division.
(g)(12) Parent's and Purchaser's Memorandum of Law in Support of the
Parent Motion to Dismiss (including the exhibits attached
thereto).
(g)(13) Reply Memorandum in further support of Purchaser's Petitions for
Hearing and to Intervene and Consolidate, filed with the Florida
Department of Insurance on February 13, 1998, including the
following exhibits:
Exhibit A: Parent's and Purchaser's Memorandum of Law in Support of the
Parent Motion to Dismiss (included as Exhibit (g)(12) hereto).
Exhibit B: AIG Complaint (previously filed as Exhibit (g)(10) to the Schedule
14D-1 and incorporated herein by reference).
Exhibit C: "AIG Becomes New Quackenbush Target," The Insurance Regulator, p.1
(July 21, 1997).
Exhibit D: "AIG Assails Cendant's Reputation In Battle for American Bankers,"
The Wall Street Journal, p.B5 (February 9, 1998).
Exhibit E: Takeover Stock Report, dated February 3, 1998.
(g)(14) Reply Memorandum in further support of Purchaser's Motion to
Consolidate, filed with the Florida Department of Insurance on
February 13, 1998, (exhibits to this Reply Memorandum have been
provided with Exhibit (g)(13) attached hereto).
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,
and AIGF, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 98-0247-CIV-GRAHAM
v. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUBE
CENDANT CORPORATION and
SEASON ACQUISITION CORP.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
--------------------------
Defendants Cedant Corporation and Season Acquisition Corp., hereby
move this Court pursuant to Rules 9(b), 12(b)(6) and 13(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint filed in the above-captioned action.
The grounds for the relief requested are set forth in the defendants'
memorandum of law filed simultaneously with this motion.
Case No. 98-CIV-GRAHAM
Dated: February 13, 1998
Miami, Florida
Respectfully submitted,
SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP
1500 Miami Center
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131
Telephone: 305-358-6300
Facsimile: 305-381-9982
By: /s/ Robert T. Wright, Jr.
------------------------------
Robert T. Wright, Jr.
Florida Bar No. 185525
John C. Shawde
Florida Bar No. 449784
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Cendant Corporation and
Season Acquisition Corp.
Of Counsel:
Jonathan J. Lerner
Samuel Kadet
Seth M. Schwartz
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Telephone: 212-735-3000
Facsimile: 212-735-2000
Case No. 98-CIV-GRAHAM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
----------------------
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a ture and correct copy of the foregoing Motion
to Dismiss has been served this 13th day of February, 1998, upon the following:
VIA HAND-DELIVERY TO: VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIN TO:
Lewis F. Murphy, Esq. Richard H. Klapper, Esq.
Steel, Hector & Davis LLP SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
Co-Counsel for AIG and AIG Co-Counsel for AIG and AIGF
200 South Biscayne Boulevard 125 Broad Street
First Union Financial Center, Suite 4000 New York, New York 10004-2498
Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Facsimile: (212) 558-4000
/s/ Robert T. Wright, Jr.
----------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,
AND AIGF, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 98-0247-CIV-GRAHAM
v. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUBE
CENDANT CORPORATION, and SEASON
ACQUISITION CORP.,
Defendants.
/
- ---------------------------------------
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS
-------------------------------------
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On its face, AIG's complaint, which should be dismissed
because it is a compulsory counterclaim and because of numerous other fatal
defects, is a thinly-veiled public relations ploy wholly lacking in merit.
Riddled with personal attacks on Cendant's Chief Executive Officer, Henry
Silverman, and based on nothing more than selected quotes taken out of context
from various articles, AIG's complaint is a transparent and vindictive - and
unbecoming - attempt to sully the reputations of Cendant and its chief
executive because they have dared to out-compete AIG for control of American
Bankers.
Stripped of its rhetoric, the bulk of the complaint attacks
certain opinions expressed by Mr. Silverman during an analysts call, which
occurred before Cendant commenced its tender offer. Obviously threatened by
the overwhelming economic superiority of Cendant's bid, most of AIG's attacks
focus on Mr. Silverman's opinion that Cendant's bid was on equal regulatory
footing with AIG's proposed merger. In essence, AIG alleges that the stated
view is misleading because it fails to adopt and disclose AIG's skewed and
self-serving opinion that Cendant will have a more difficult time than AIG
obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals - an opinion that is at odds with
the opinions of independent analysts, such as analysts at Bear Stearns, which
recently publicly validated Mr. Silverman's opinion: "From a regulatory
perspective, the companies should be considered on equal footing, both in
terms of probability and timing." (Bear Stearns Equity Research, dated
February 12, 1997) (hereinafter, "Bear Stearns Report") (Emphasis supplied.)
(Ex. A)
As the Bear Stearns Report states:
From a broader financial perspective, AIG is heralding its
AAA-rating. But Cendant is also quite strong financially
with an A-rating: the company notes that this is a higher
debt rating than is currently enjoyed by American Bankers.
Excluding assets and matched liabilities of its management
programs, Cendant has long term debt of $1.3 billion
(including about $800 million of convertible debt) and
shareholders' equity of $4.5 billion. The company, in our
view, has substantial unused debt capacity. In addition, we
forecast Cendant's free cash flow at $1.3 billion for 1998
and $1.7 billion for 1999. In our check within the insurance
industry, we find that Cendant's financial position would
qualify it as a buyer from a regulatory perspective. Again,
we conclude that both companies are qualified, serious
potential buyers. In fact, because the deal is a cash/stock
combination, Cendant may be better-positioned because its
stock carries a higher multiple than that of AIG.
(Emphasis supplied.)
2
In seeking to buttress its otherwise unsupported speculation
concerning the relative timing of regulatory approvals, AIG engages in a
lengthy personal attack on Mr. Silverman, suggesting, among other things, that
regulatory approval will be delayed or denied because Cendant's earnings are
allegedly "inflated" and Mr. Silverman has a "checkered business history."
But, AIG's disingenuous efforts to create the perception of a "regulatory
timing gap" through its patchwork of disparaging statements of immaterial
opinion fail to state a claim. As a matter of law, it is well established that
statements of opinion are actionable only when "defendants either did not have
these favorable opinions on future prospects when they made the statements or
that the favorable opinions were without a basis in fact." In re Time Warner
Inc. Securities Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)).
Here, the complaint is devoid of any allegation that Mr.
Silverman did not have the favorable view he expressed or that there was no
basis for the opinion. Indeed, the statements of AIG's own agents supply ample
basis in fact and demolish its spurious allegations:
o AIG's own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, reaffirmed
Cendant for its Priority List of most highly recommended
stocks.
o The Goldman Sachs analyst picked Cendant as his number one
stock pick for 1998.
o In a report dated January 22, 1998, the Goldman Sachs
analyst stated that "Cendant is a cash flow machine
currently generating $1.3 billion in free cash flow
annually, "and that "[t]here are very few [other] 25% growth
stories in the market with the liquidity of $31 billion
market cap that are insulated from the Asian economic
crisis."
3
Furthermore, Cendant already has been approved by the Insurance Departments in
both New York and Colorado to run an insurance company and has been approved
by other regulatory authorities to participate in other highly regulated
industries.
Conversely, Mr. Silverman's "equal footing" opinion is
fortified by a wealth of extremely troubling information about AIG, Maurice
Greenberg its chairman and the secretive companies that control AIG, that no
doubt will occupy regulators reviewing AIG's regulatory application. After
all, given AIG's own public track record, there is more than ample basis to
believe Cendant is more likely than AIG to gain regulatory approval, and that
approval may be quicker for Cendant once regulators focus on AIG and the
shadowy off-shore companies that its chairman, Maurice Greenberg, uses to
secretly control AIG.
o AIG is controlled by a private, little-known group of three
mysterious entities -- Starr International Company, Inc., an
off-shore company registered in Panama; The Starr
Foundation; and C.V. Starr & Co.
o These Starr entities are, in turn, controlled by AIG's
Chairman Maurice Greenberg by virtue of his stock ownership
and his control over the boards of these entities which are
populated by his subordinates.
o Over the past 15 years, these Starr entities have received
hundreds of millions of dollars of payments from AIG. And
the Starr entities -- as well as Greenberg -- conveniently
use their structure to avoid full disclosure of their
activities.
o From 1973 through 1996, Starr entities received net payments
of over $432 million from AIG in "commissions" for the
production of insurance business.
o The Starr Foundation's certificate of incorporation states
it shall be operated exclusively for "religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes," and that "no
part ... shall [be] to the benefit of or be distributed to
any member, director or officer of the corporation or any
other private individual." Further, it states that "no
substantial part ... shall be carrying on propaganda or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation...." Yet, The
4
Washington Post (May 2, 1996) raised allegations that AIG
may have used the foundation to buy political influence with
the Republican Party.
Given this substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence of
control over AIG, these Starr entities and Greenberg, who controls them and
ultimately AIG, their failure to separately file forms for insurance
regulatory approval - which the Starr entities filed with the Office of Thrift
Supervision to become a savings and loan holding company -- will substantially
delay AIG's application. In this context, AIG's claims that Mr. Silverman's
view of an equal regulatory footing is legally way off base.
Of similar ilk are the suggestions by AIG that an alleged
former association with Drexel Burnham Lambert would delay Cendant's
regulatory approval. In reality, these allegations turn to bite AIG and
Greenberg. Under the direction of Greenberg, AIG formed a partnership with
Drexel Burnham & Lambert, and after its demise maintained a close association
with, and has employed, several former senior officials of the bankrupt Drexel
Burnham Lambert to speculate in high risk junk bonds and other exotic
financial products -- referred to by AIG as "wild things".
o "In 1987, both [Howard] Sosin [, formerly of Drexel Burnham
Lambert,] and [Randall] Rackson began working at a start-up
company, AIG-FP [AIG Financial Products, Inc.], formed to
engage in business relating to derivatives and other complex
financial products. AIG-FP was a joint venture owned by
Sosin and AIG [American International Group] .... The senior
management team for the joint venture was composed of Sosin,
Rackson, and Barry Goldman, an associate of Sosin and head
of derivative research at Drexel Burnham Lambert ... ."
Rackson v. Sosin, No. 95 Civ. 1105 (LAP), 1997 WL 786940, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1997).
o "In May of 1988, non-defendant Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc. ... and defendant American International Group ...
formed TriCapital, Ltd. ..., a Bermuda-based corporation,
the assets of which were to be invested in a diversified
pool of high-yield, short-term, non-investment grade,
corporate
5
debt securities, commonly known as junk bonds." Columbia
Savs. & Loan Assoc. v. American Int'l Group, Inc., No. 91
Civ. 0589 (MJL), 1994 WL 114828, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1994). Tri-Capital was "intended to bring a wide range of
investors to the junk bond market," as reported in Corporate
Financing Week on May 23, 1988, and was managed by a
partnership of Drexel Burnham and AIG Capital. When
Tri-Capital's junk bond invest ments failed, some of its
investors sued, charging AIG with misrepresenting its
experience with junk bonds and allowing Drexel to use
Tri-Capital "as a vehicle to unload securities it had
underwritten which would otherwise have been difficult or
impossible to place." Columbia Savs. & Loan Assoc., 1994 WL
114828, *2.
o A September 6, 1993 Investment Dealers Digest article states
that, "Maurice (Hank) Greenberg recruited Sosin and a team
of professionals from Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1987 to
create AIG Financial Products," and that, "[n]ot only were
some of AIGFP's investments headed south under Sosin, but
the group was also engaging in ever-more exotic derivatives
-- 'wild things,' as one AIG official calls them." (Emphasis
supplied.)
o A July 30, 1990 Crain's New York Business article reported
that in March 1990, "AIG entered a joint venture agreement
with three former top officials from Drexel Burnham Lambert
Inc.," and that the division "now operating as AIG Trading
from its Fort Lee, N.J., offices, is at the center of an
international controversy." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is also little, if any, doubt that AIG's regulatory
approval, at a minimum, will be delayed when insurance regulators meet to
thoroughly investigate the highly unusual and unseemly transactions that
Greenberg caused AIG to engage in to benefit his relative by marriage, Mel
Harris. Among these was the $44 million acquisition of Fischbach Corp. which
was operated by the notorious Victor Posner, described as a "corporate
carnivore and convicted felon."
o A June 24, 1990 article in Newsday states, "IF THERE EVER
was a com pany with a curse on it, it has to be the
Fischbach Corp., the New York-based electrical contracting
company. Not only has Fischbach itself been devas tated by
the takeover shenanigans of the 1980s, but so have the key
players involved in the 1985 takeover of the company by
Victor Posner."
6
o "And now, yet another victim seems to be spattered by the
mud that seems to besmirch everyone who comes near
Fischbach: American International Group, and its chairman,
Maurice (Hank) Greenberg. AIG, a huge, successful insurance
holding company, is in the midst of buying Fischbach for $11
per share." Id.
o "AIG took over the business in 1986. Guess what? It's having
so much trouble getting paid that it had to take out second
mortgages on Fischbach properties to ensure payment of more
than $20 million of past-due premiums, has had to lend
Fischbach money to keep it afloat and now has to go through
a complicated and expensive takeover of its client to
protect itself against losses on the policies that the
client took out." Id.
o "And Fischbach, it turns out, isn't just any piece of
insurance business. It was business brought to AIG by Mel
Harris, an insurance broker at Alexander & Alexander in
Miami. Harris, a big producer at A&A, is related to
Greenberg's wife -- they're cousins -- and socialize with
Greenberg." Id.
(Emphasis supplied.)
o "Harris says that despite his relationship with the
Greenbergs, none of his business -- including the Fischbach
business -- got any special treatment from AIG's
underwriters. "Being a cousin of Mrs. Greenberg is not of
any value when you are dealing with the surety department of
AIG," Harris said wryly." Id.
o "Harris' statement notwithstanding, the Harris-Greenberg
relationship strikes me as a piece of information that I
would like to have if I owned stock in either Fischbach or
AIG. To me, it looks bad not to have disclosed this
relationship, because it looks like AIG is hiding something.
I also would be curious whether AIG has gotten Alexander
&Alexander to bear part of AIG's effort and expense in
tending to the Fischbach account." Id. (Emphasis supplied.)
o A 1989 Business Week article reports that Mel Harris was
close to Victor Posner's son as he attended high school with
the Fischbach owner's son Steven. Posner attempted to sell
his 53% stake in the company to Asher De Vere. Harris
introduced DeVere to Posner. However, the deal collapsed.
The article states that following the collapse, "trading in
Fischbach shares on the New York Stock Exchange was halted.
And that afternoon, Fischbach disclosed that DeVere's group
in fact had no financing." The article reported that Harris
stood to collect a $645,000 finder's fee. A Posner
spokesperson
7
stated that it was Harris' association with AIG that lent
credibility to his introduction of DeVere's group. (Emphasis
supplied.)
AIG's attempt to obtain regulatory approval, no doubt, will
also be adversely affected by its notorious past business practices which have
been characterized by one regulator as "repulsive":
o In 1992, one of AIG's executive vice presidents, Jeffrey W.
Greenberg -- Maurice Greenberg's son -- wrote an internal
memo that stated that "Hurri cane Andrew provides 'an
opportunity to get price increases now.'" Meg Fletcher &
Douglas McLeod, AIG memo causes storm; Regulators vow to
scrutinize rate hikes in wake of Hurricane Andrew losses,
Bus. Ins., Sep. 14, 1992. "[T]he Florida insurance
commissioner and state treasurer, ... froze AIG rates and
premiums ... [to] give state officials time to investigate
the insurer's rate-setting practices, including whether it
has violated Florida laws against unfair trade practices or
antitrust activities .... 'AIG ... better get this message
now: We won't tolerate any company trying to take advantage
of our citizens in the aftermath of this tragedy,'. . . ."
Id.
o The same article noted that other state insurance
commissioners also ex pressed outrage about AIG's apparent
desire to capitalize on the devastation wrought by Hurricane
Andrew. James H. Brown, the Louisiana insurance commissioner
at the time, said "'[t]he fact that anyone would try to take
advantage of victims of a storm and use them as a vehicle to
get higher rates is nothing less than repulsive. ... I find
it unbelievable that it would even cross someone's mind.'"
Id. Salvatore Curiale, New York Insurance Superintendent at
the time, said that "'[a]ny kind of public capital that they
have gotten from what they did well in the hurricane is all
kind of soured in the public mind because of the memo.'" Id.
o A later article also noted that J. Robert Hunter, at the
time the president of the National Insurance Consumer
Organization and later the Texas Insurance Commissioner,
"blasted American International Group Inc. ... for its
attempt to raise rates following Hurricane Andrew, calling
the move a 'blatant, us-first price-fixing strategy.'" Nancy
P. Johnson, New Texas job but same ol' Bob; Consumers to
remain focus in new post, Bus. Ins., Oct. 18, 1993.
o A 1997 article in Insurance Accountant reported that the
California Depart ment of Insurance had "opened an
investigation of AIG's business practices." Elizabeth Festa,
AIG Becomes New Quackenbush Target, Ins. Acct., Jul. 21,
1997. In particular, "[t]he department ha[d] been alerted to
AIG's attempt to
8
disrupt the economic relations between Golden Eagle
[Insurance Co.] and its new owner, Liberty Mutual." Id.
"Consumer complaints about [AIG's] insurance practices and
conduct, coupled with the 'recent disturbing events in the
Golden Eagle rehabilitation,' fueled the push for an
investigation and a hearing, according to the department.
Mark Lowder, enforcement chief for the department, said that
the business practices under investigation are primarily
those of allegedly spreading false statements to third
parties." Id. "'We have received numerous complaints from
consumers about AIG's conduct,' stated Joel Laucher,
division chief of consumer services for the department."
Id.; Golden Eagle caught up in a quagmire, San Diego Daily
Transcript, July 18, 1997.
o Another article reported that Dana Spurrier, a spokeswoman
for California Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush,
said that "[i]t appears AIG is doing everything they can to
destroy the rehabilitation effort of Golden Eagle, and
that's of utmost concern to us .... They're destroying the
rehabilitation at the expense of consumers, policyholders,
claimants, agents and everyone involved." California
Regulators Probe AIG in Golden Eagle Feud, Best's Ins. News,
Jul. 15, 1997.
AIG has also been widely criticized for its apparent pattern
of bad faith claims handling practices. Such practices will also likely
adversely affect AIG in the regulatory approval process.
o An October 15, 1996 article in the Wall Street Journal
described how AIG "battles" its policyholders and reported
that Maurice Greenberg is known as the "'Paul Masson of the
insurance industry' -- he pays no claims before their time."
The same article reported that U.S. District Judge David
Briones found that AIG's interpretation of its
errors-and-omissions policy was so restrictive that it
didn't cover "a single category of potential damages under
Texas law."
o The pattern apparently continues -- just last year, a Los
Angeles jury awarded $10 million in punitive damages against
AIG subsidiary Landmark Insurance Co. in an action brought
by an insured, finding that Landmark had acted with "malice
or fraud."
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Silverman had a reasonable -
if not overwhelming - basis on which to express his view that Cendant would,
at a minimum, stand on equal
9
footing with AIG in the regulatory approval process. Accordingly, AIG has not,
and cannot, state a claim under the federal securities laws. As discussed
below, AIG's other allegations are similarly defective, and its complaint
should therefore be dismissed in all respects..
STATEMENT OF FACTS
OVERVIEW OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS.
AIG's claims relate generally to four subjects: (i) Mr.
Silverman' s statements that the competing proposals are on "equal footing;"
(ii) Mr. Silverman's opinions regarding future growth and cost savings; (iii)
Cendant's statements that its offer is not conditioned upon obtaining
financing; and (iv) Cendant's alleged failure to disclose risks of a business
downturn. These alleged false statements or omissions occurred in (i) a
pre-tender offer conference call with analysts, (ii) Cendant's Schedule 14D-1
and (iii) Cendant's preliminary proxy statement. Accordingly, AIG has alleged
that Cendant has violated Sections 14(a) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act. In
addition, in order to end-run the standing requirements of the 1933 Act, AIG
has alleged that Cendant has violated "Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act based
upon violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act." While AIG's prayer for relief
suggests that it is seeking injunctive relief in the form of corrective
disclosures, it has not filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. As
shown below, none of AIG's claims has merit.
THE "EQUAL FOOTING" CLAIMS.
AIG claims that Mr. Silverman's statement that the two
competing acquisi tion proposals are on "equal footing" is false because AIG
has a different opinion as to how the regulators will proceed. Rather than
allege "facts" in support of this claim, AIG attempts to buttress it with a
series of alleged omissions. For instance, AIG alleges that Cendant has
10
failed to disclose that it will have a difficult time obtaining regulatory
approval because, according to AIG:
o Cendant's financial condition cannot be evaluated with any
degree of confidence because it has undertaken numerous
acquisitions (Compl. P. 25(a));
o Cendant has few tangible assets and has allocated its cost
of purchasing companies to good will and other assets (Comp.
P. 25(b));(1)
o Cendant's growth-by-acquisition strategy and large amounts
of intangible assets will likely result in decreased
earnings in the future (Compl. P. 25(c));(2)
o Cendant's Chief Executive Officer, Henry Silverman, has a
"checkered business history" because as head of Reliance
Capital Corporation, Mr. Silverman conducted business with
Drexel Burnham Lambert (Compl. P. 25(d));
o Mr. Silverman has been affiliated with a number of companies
which have gone into bankruptcy, including Days Inn of
America, Amre, Inc. and John Blair & Company (Compl. P.
25(e)-(f)); and
o Cendant "has limited experience in the business of insurance
and clearly does not have the level and degree of experience
of AIG." (Compl. P. 25(h)).
None of AIG's colorful statements suggests any improper
conduct on the part of Mr. Silverman or Cendant, let alone securities fraud.
For example, the various references to Drexel Burnham Lambert, Michael Milken
and others are obviously designed to suggest
- ---------------
(1) Notably, AIG has not alleged that Cendant has violated Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles in any way. Even if it had made such
allegations, they would not constitute a violation of the federal
securities laws. See Stavroff v. Meyo, et al., C.A. No. 95-4118, slip
op. at 12 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) ("Courts have determined that GAAP
violations, standing alone, are not tantamount to securities
fraud.").
(2) AIG's assertion about the intangible nature of Cendant's assets
should fool no one. Apparently, AIG believes that owning a decrepit,
but tangible building is more valuable than owning the right to
license names such as Avis, Days Inn and Century 21. The mere
statement of AIG's proposition exposes it as absurd.
11
guilt by association. If these allegations are actionable -- which they are
not -- AIG should have disclosed its own, apparently extensive, connections
with Drexel Burnham Lambert.
With respect to AIG's opinions regarding Mr. Silverman's
alleged "checkered business history," Cendant's alleged omissions cannot
possibly be material because, among other reasons, AIG has presented a highly
distorted picture based on selected data. If Cendant's alleged omissions were
material - which they are not - a complete chronological summary of every
business transaction Mr. Silverman ever undertook would be required.
Obviously, the federal securities laws require no such thing. However, if they
did, AIG's highly distorted picture would be adjusted to include the
following:
o Mr. Silverman left Days Inn in November of 1989, two years
before it filed for bankruptcy. During that ensuing two-year
period after his departure, material significant events such
as the Gulf War, the recession, the collapse of the
high-yield bond market and a government-induced collapse of
certain segments of the financial markets resulted in a
significant reduction in domestic travel and thus had a
significant impact on Days Inn's performance.
o As to alleged "decreases in quality of the lodging
operations as a result of Cendant's franchising strategy"
(Compl. P. 25(g)), an "Overall Image Summary" conducted by
D.K. Shifflet & Associates, Ltd. for 1994-1996 shows that
the quality in service for Ramada and Howard Johnson has
increased during such chains' ownership by Cendant.
o The management group that ran Amre prior to and at the time
it filed for bankruptcy was already in place when HFS made
its investment in the corporation, and established its
licensor-licensee relationship. HFS played no role in the
selection of the Amre Management group. HFS had only a 2%
equity interest and had three non management directors on
Amre's ten-person board of directors. HFS lost all of its
investment along with the rest of the stockholders and also
lost substantially all of the license fees payable to it.
o John Blair & Co. entered bankruptcy proceedings 3 1/2 years
after Mr. Silverman left the company.
12
o With regard to the ERISA litigation, AIG conveniently fails
to disclose that the District Court, which decided the case
based on a stipulation of facts, explicitly noted that
plaintiffs "do not allege any deliberate misconduct or
improper delay on the part of defendants in carrying out
their duties," and that the issues are of statutory duty and
not of overreaching." The John Blair Communications, Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan et al. v. Telemundo Group, Inc Profit
Sharing Plan et al., 816 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The
District Court further found that "Plaintiffs have not shown
and do not even allege that the delay in transferring the
assets was either undue or intentional." 816 F. Supp. at
952. Indeed, the District Court found in favor of the
defendants. The Second Circuit, in reversing, observed that
the failure to transfer the investment gains issue was "one
of first impression in this Circuit and appears not to have
been addressed elsewhere." The John Blair Communications,
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan et al. v. Telemundo Group, Inc.
Profit Sharing Plan et al. 26 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 1994).
It should also be noted that the matters at issue were
technical and legal in nature and that the defendants,
including Henry Silverman, were represented by Dewey
Ballantine LLP, counsel to American Bankers Insurance Group,
Inc. here.
MR. SILVERMAN'S OPINIONS REGARDING GROWTH AND SAVINGS.
AIG claims that "Silverman's representations that $140
million in pre-tax synergies (mostly through increased revenues) would be
achieved is knowingly false and misleading." (Compl. P. 28) In essence, AIG
merely claims that Cendant's failure to disclose its contrary opinion amounts
to fraud.(3) AIG pleads no fact which suggest that Cendant does not believe
those savings can be achieved.
- ----------------
(3) Cost savings will be achieved as Cendant mails and direct markets
more than any other company and through a highly technologically
sophisticated computer system. On the revenue side of the equation,
Cendant plans to sell American Bankers' products through Cendant's
channels, and plans to sell Cendant products through American
Bankers' channels. In addition, American Bankers has various
proprietary ideas for new distribution channels. While AIG suggests
that Cendant's direct marketing business experience is irrelevant
(Comp. P. 25(h)), American Bankers' 1996 Annual Report shows that
"American Bankers leads all other insurance companies in third-party
direct marketing and is ranked fifth overall on a list of 36 leading
insurance direct marketers." 1996 Annual Report. As Cendant's and
American Bankers' businesses overlap, the potential for other
synergies is obvious.
13
THE FINANCING CONDITION CLAIMS.
AIG's claim that Cendant has falsely stated that it has no
financing conditions is frivolous. This contention is squarely refuted by
Cendant's Schedule 14D-1 which identifies all conditions to Cendant's offer,
and does not provide any "out" based on a failure to obtain financing.
Financing is not a condition of the offer.
CENDANT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO DISCLOSE RISKS OF A BUSINESS DOWNTURN.
AIG claims that Cendant has "failed to disclose that the
partial currency of the Cendant Merger -- Cendant's common stock -- is likely
to be as volatile as the stock of its predecessor HFS." (Compl. P. 32) Not
only does AIG fail to plead any factual basis for its speculation, but as
noted above, AIG's own financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, stated in a January
22, 1998 report that Cendant stock was a priority pick and Cendant's
businesses, unlike AIG's, were "insulated from the Asian economic crisis."
ARGUMENT
I. THE COMPLAINT ATTEMPTS TO STATE COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIMS AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
As a threshold matter, even if the Complaint otherwise
stated a legally viable claim for relief -- and it does not -- it would have
to be dismissed as it violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). The
claims AIG attempts to assert here obviously arise from the same transactions
as the claims alleged by Cendant in its earlier-filed action against American
Bankers, its directors and AIG (Cendant Corp. et al. v. American Bankers Ins.
Group, Inc. et al., Case No. 98-0159-Civ-Moore). Accordingly, they are
therefore "compulsory counterclaims" within the meaning of Rule 13(a). See
Tullos v. Parks, 915 F.2d 1192,
14
1196 (8th Cir. 1990) (counterclaims were compulsory where "all the claims
asserted by both sides in this case are part of the fight between the parties
for control" of bank). Compulsory counterclaims which are improperly brought
as a separate action must be dismissed. Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure
ss. 1418, at 142-43 (2d ed. 1990)).
II. THE CLAIM IN THE COMPLAINT CONCERNING REGULATORY
APPROVAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
A. THE REGULATORY CLAIM IS MOOT
Although the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief
based on Mr. Silverman's statements about regulatory approval, the Court need
not even reach that question because Cendant has filed the Complaint as an
exhibit to an amendment to its Schedule 14D-1. As a result, insofar as the
Complaint is premised on purported misstatements concerning a technical
administrative matter such as insurance regulatory approval, such disclosure
renders the Complaint moot and warrants dismissal. Avnet, Inc. v. Scope
Indus., 499 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
In Avnet, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had made
false and misleading disclosures in their Schedule 13D because the defendants
"failed to disclose that [defendant] Scope [Industries] was an unregistered
investment company in violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940." Id. at
1122. The defendants, who believed that Scope was not an investment company,
responded to the plaintiff's complaint by filing an amended Schedule 13D that
summarized and denied the allegations of Avnet's complaint. Id. at 1124. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
the
15
defendants' amended Schedule 13D was "sufficient to cure any alleged
omissions" concern ing Scope's status an investment company. Id. The court
explained that "the purpose of the disclosure provisions of the securities
laws is to see to it that the insider, management official, proxy solicitor,
tender offeror or substantial shareholder, as the case may be, discloses to
the investor the facts as truly believed by the disclosure." Id. at 1125
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim
relating to the defendants' alleged failure to disclose Scope's status as an
investment company. Id. at 1126. See also Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., C.A. No. 4:97-CV-509-Y (N.D. Tex., Sept. 10, 1997) (Order)
Exhibit B. ("because the September 8th amendment to Plaintiff's schedule 14D-1
contains the disclosures Pennzoil sought by way of injunction to require
Plaintiffs to make, it is not necessary for the Court to make any finding that
Plaintiff did, or did not, violate the Act nor whether the disclosures which
were made were required").
B. THE REGULATORY APPROVAL CLAIM FAILS
TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF
On its face, AIG's attempt to debate the accuracy of Mr.
Silverman's views concerning the timing of regulatory approvals fails to state
a claim under the federal securities laws. As a matter of law, it is well
established that statements of opinion are actionable only when "defendants
either did not have these favorable opinions on future prospects when they
made the statements or that the favorable opinions were without a basis in
fact." In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)). Here, AIG has not alleged, and
cannot allege, that Mr. Silverman did not believe his views were correct or
that there was no factual basis for them.
16
Indeed, given all the positives concerning Cendant, including public
statements from AIG's own financial advisor and the deluge of troubling
information concerning AIG and its chairman, Mr. Silverman's "equal footing"
prediction was reasonable as a matter of law.
III. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AND
FAILS TO PLEAD FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY.
The court should grant a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) where the plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with the
complaint that would entitle him or her to relief. Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 923 (11th Cir. 1997). In reviewing a motion to
dismiss, the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras, 129
F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 1997). However, the court only takes as true those
factual allegations that are "well-pleaded." Id.; Williams v. Alabama State
University, 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997). The court "need not accept
factual claims that are internally inconsistent; facts which run counter to
facts of which the court can take judicial notice; conclusory allegations;
unwarranted deductions; or mere legal conclusions asserted by a party."
Response Oncology, Inc. v. Metrahealth Insurance Co., 978 F. Supp. 1052, 1058
(S.D. Fla. 1997).(4)
- ---------------
(4) In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the
complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated therein, and
facts of which the court is entitled to take judicial notice. Arango
v. United Stated Dep't. of the Treasury, 115 F.3d 922, 923-24 & n.1
(11th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 934, 938 (11th Cir.
1986). In particular, where securities fraud is alleged, the court
may consider any documents that were required to be filed, and were
filed, with SEC. Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F3d 1015,
1017-18 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1996).
17
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies a
heightened pleading standard -- "particularity" -- to claims of fraud. Zeid v.
Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act"), Rule 9(b)'s
pleading burden of particularity applies to all securities fraud claims under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("Congress intended to assure
that the requirements of Rule 9(b) were met in all securities fraud cases
....").
The Reform Act requires that a complaint plead each
statement alleged to be misleading with particularity, and mandates that a
complaint set forth in detail "the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading." 15 U.S.C. ss. 78u-4(b)(1)(B). Where an allegation is made on
information and belief, as here,(5) a complaint also must "state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." Id. A complaint that
does not meet this requirement "shall" be dismissed. 15 U.S.C. ss.
78u-4(b)(3)(A).
Likewise, the Reform Act requires particularized pleading of
the defendant's culpable state of mind -- a necessary element of Plaintiffs'
claims. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974)) (liability under
- -------------
(5) Although Plaintiffs nowhere expressly state the basis for their
various allegations, it can only be assumed that they do not claim
personal knowledge of Mr. Silverman's alleged fraudulent intent. In
any event, a plaintiff cannot avoid the pleading requirements
accompanying allegations made "on information and belief" by failing
to specify the basis for the pleading. See Hockey v. Medhekar, [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P. 99,465, at 97,081 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 15, 1997); Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 763-64.
18
Section 14(e) requires proof of scienter); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973)
(same); Union of Needletrades v. May Department Stores Co., 1997 WL 714886
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1997), slip op. at *6 ("The strict pleading requirements of
Fed. R.Civ. P. 9(b) apply to SEC Rule 14a-9 claims"). Accordingly, under the
Reform Act, a complaint in any action brought under those sections must "with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. ss. 77u-4(b)(2).
A straightforward application of these heightened pleading
standards to the Complaint requires its dismissal.
A. MR. SILVERMAN'S OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN A PRE-TENDER OFFER
CONFERENCE CALL DO NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR SECURITIES FRAUD.
Most of AIG's claims are merely differences of opinion with
certain statements made by Mr. Silverman during a January 27, 1998 call with
analysts. These allegedly false and misleading statements concerned the timing
of the regulatory process, future growth, and anticipated cost savings:
o Cendant's bid to acquire American Bankers was on an "equal
footing with AIG on the basis of timing" and "AIG is
essentially no further along than we are" since regulatory
approvals "usually take months to complete...." (Compl.P.
23);
o "[w]e think we can add several million new policies outside
the U.S. over the next few years." (Compl. P. 26); and
o "the combination of our companies should result in
considerable cost savings. ... In [telecommunications] we've
already identified about $140 million of pre-tax
synergies,..." (Compl. P. 27).
19
These so-called "claims" are not actionable as securities
fraud. The federal securities laws do not require Cendant to disclose AIG's
contrary opinions or beliefs. See Kahn v. Wien, 842 F. Supp. 667, 677
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[t]he securities laws do not require that a proxy
solicitation discuss all the arguments against, or all the alternatives to,
the proposed course of action"); Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp.
519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting that proxy provisions of the securities laws
"are aimed at disclosing all material facts, not at ensuring an exhaustive,
dispassionate, and evenly balanced presentation of conflicting interpretations
of the facts given").
Similarly, it cannot be misleading for Cendant to refuse to
characterize its proposed transaction or Mr. Silverman with "pejorative nouns
or adjectives or fail to draw adverse inferences from the facts disclosed."
Issen v. GSC Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Here, AIG has failed to allege any facts, let alone facts
with particularity, to support its claims. See Schuster v. Symmetricon, Inc.
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P. 99, 437, at 96, 865 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 1997) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff failed to point to
particular contemporaneous inconsistent statements by defen dants).(6) Nowhere
does the Complaint allege with sufficient particularity factual support for
- ---------------
(6) The allegations relating to the January 27, 1998 analyst call
should be dismissed for the additional reason that AIG fails to
allege whether and how these statements to the analysts were relayed
to the market. See Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (dismissing complaint for failure to allege that information
allegedly conveyed to analysts was relayed to the market). While it
states in conclusory fashion that, "[t]hese misleading disclosures
were repeated in subsequent public filings and materials disseminated
to American Bankers' shareholders" (Compl. P. 22), AIG fails to
identify any such document.
(continued...)
20
the proposition that any of these allegations about Cendant and Mr. Silverman
would hinder or delay regulatory approval. Nor does the Complaint
particularize, as it must under the Reform Act, why Defendants' beliefs about
regulatory approval were misleading, or allege any specific facts showing that
Defendants did not believe that their statements were accurate at the time
they were made.
In fact, a recent report by an independent third party, Bear
Stearns, confirms that Mr. Silverman had an ample basis to state that the AIG
and Cendant applications were on equal footing: "[f]rom a regulatory
perspective, the companies should be considered on equal footing, both in
terms of probability of approval and timing." See Bear Stearns Report at 2.
The report points out that both AIG and Cendant will need regulatory approvals
by insurance commissions in six states. The report states further that "both
companies are qualified, serious potential buyers," and that "Cendant may be
better-positioned because its stock carries a higher multiple than that of
AIG." Id.
Plaintiffs' speculative, conclusory allegations are
insufficient as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 15 U.S.C. s
78u-4(b)(1); see also Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061,
1068-70 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of allegations based on
information and belief and stating that such pleading technique "'must not be
mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory
allegations'") (citation omitted); Crystal v. Foy, 562 F. Supp. 422, 432-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing
- --------------
(...continued)
22), AIG fails to identify any such document.
21
plaintiff's securities claim with prejudice for failure to plead with
sufficient particularity the source of facts upon which plaintiff's
information and belief were based).
The 14D-1 filed by Season and Cendant subsequent to the
analyst conference sets out in detail for the shareholders to consider the
procedures required to obtain state insurance approvals in the requisite
states. See Schedule 14D-1 at 39-40.(7) Moreover, the 14D-1 warns that "there
can be no assurance that any such approval or action . . . would be obtained
or would be obtained without substantial conditions or that adverse
consequences might not result to the business of the Company . . . ." Id. at
39. In short, Cendant disclosed everything it was required to disclose; any
further disclosure as to the timing of or prospects for regulatory approval
would have been speculative, and might well have been affirma tively
misleading.
B. PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO CENDANT'S SCHEDULE 14D-1
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR SECURITIES FRAUD.
1. AIG'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING "BUSINESS DOWNTURNS"
AND STOCK PRICE FLUCTUATIONS ARE MERITLESS.
The balance of AIG's Section 14(e) claims fare no better.
Plaintiffs contend that the Schedule 14D-1 should disclose certain purported
facts allegedly relevant to the value of the Cendant shares that American
Bankers stockholders would receive in a second-step merger. For instance, the
complaint alleges that:
- ---------------
(7) Cendant disclosed in Amendment No. 3 to its Schedule 14D-1 that it
has filed a motion to consolidate the proceedings before the Florida
Department of Insurance. On February 11, 1998, Cendant filed a motion
to intervene in the proceedings before the Arizona Department of
Insurance.
22
o "The Schedule 14D-1 ... fails to disclose that a substantial
portion of Cendant's business is exposed to substantial
risks of a business downturn." (Compl. P. 34)
o "[T]he Schedule 14D-1 ... failed to disclose that a decrease
in the number of such acquisitions [by Cendant] would create
serious downward pressure on earnings." (Compl.P. 35)
o "Neither the Schedule 14D-1 nor any of Cendant's public
filings disclose the recent volatility of HFS stock or
potential volatility of Cendant stock, and the serious risk
that American Bankers' shareholders may not get $58.00 per
share immediately after the Cendant Merger closes." (Compl.
P. 32)
Of course, the value of Cendant stock could fluctuate after
the closing of the second-step merger. As a matter of law, defendants are not
required to disclose an obvious, self-evident fact such as that. Zerman v.
Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is not a violation of any securities
law to fail to disclose a result that is obvious even to a person with only an
elementary understanding of the stock market.") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Sulzer v. Associated Madison Companies, Inc., 1985 WL 5856 (M.D.
Fla. May 10, 1985) ("[T]he corporation has no duty to disclose facts which
would be obvious to the ordinary investor.").(8) Nor are they required to
disclose Plaintiffs' own unsubstantiated "vague
- ---------------
(8) The Complaint also alleges that Defendants' statement that the
Cendant Bid represents a premium of $11.00 over the per common share
value of the AIG Proposed Merger is "false and misleading because it
implies that American Bankers shareholder [sic] are receiving a fixed
value for their shares when in fact they are receiving something far
more speculative -- Cendant stock." (Compl. P. 37). The Schedule
14D-1 makes clear that the form of consideration in the second step
merger is Cendant stock which at the time of issuance will have a
value of $58 per American Bankers share. As a result, Plaintiffs'
pejorative characterization of Cendant's stock as "speculative" is
immaterial as a matter of law. Hecco Ventures v. Avalon Energy Corp.,
606 F. Supp. 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Nor is there any duty to
disclose [plaintiffs']
pejorative characterizations of the merger."). Moreover, in a proxy
contest, neither
(continued...)
23
projections" about defendants' future business prospects. Schaffer v.
Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (D.N.H. 1996); Garcia v. Cordova, 930
F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding a Morgan Stanley opinion that a
stock's value could be between $40.00 and $100.00 per share to be speculative
and fall within the general rule that "unreliable information may be held to
be immaterial as a matter of law."). Finally, as shown in Part C below,
Cendant is not required to disclose in its Schedule 14D-1 all of the
information that would be disclosed in a registration statement.
2. AIG'S "FINANCING" CLAIM IS ALSO MERITLESS.
AIG's claim that Cendant has misleadingly stated that its
tender offer is not conditioned on financing is conclusively refuted by the
terms of Cendant's Schedule 14D-1. The first page of the Schedule 14D-1 sets
forth all conditions to the offer. It is clear that financing is not one of
them. The mere fact that there are conditions in the lending agreements
between Cendant and its banks is wholly irrelevant, and in any event, those
conditions are fully disclosed on pages 24 and 25 of the Schedule 14D-1.
C. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO STANDING TO ALLEGE A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 5 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT.
Finally, in Count III of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
ss.ss. 77c(a) and (c), by making statements regarding the superiority of the
Cendant bid to the AIG Merger Proposal prior to
- ---------------
(...continued)
party is required to promote the other's position. See, e.g.,
Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 649 (D. Del. 1980)
("the federal proxy rules do not require ... disclosure of one's
opponent's characterization of the facts").
24
the filing of a registration statement covering the Cendant stock that would
be offered to American Bankers shareholders in a second step merger. It is
well established, however, that Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 1933 Act,
standing alone, do not create any private right of action. See Vennittilli v.
Primerica, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 793, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing LeCroy v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Ark. 1984) ("[Section
5 of the Securities Act], standing alone, creates no private cause of action
...")). See also Goldblum v. Boyd, 60 F.R.D. 421, 423 (W.D. La. 1973) (quoting
Greater Iowa Corp. v. McClendon, 378 F.2d 783, 789 (8th Cir. 1967) for the
proposition that "[n]o civil enforce ment is provided in [15 U.S.C.
ss.77e(a)]").
Recognizing this defect, Plaintiffs attempt to bootstrap
their way to standing to bring a private cause of action under Section 5 of
the 1933 Act by captioning the count as one brought under "Section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act based upon violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act". The
attempt must fail. See Greater Iowa Corp., 378 F.2d at 790 ("It is our
conclusion that private civil liability for violations of ss.5(a) . . . exists
only when the provisions of ss.12 of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C. ss.771) [i.e.,
that one must be a purchaser of securities] are met. Therefore, plaintiffs
have no jurisdictional standing to invoke the provisions of ss.5(a) . . . of
the 1933 Act." (citations omitted)).
In any event, the allegations of the Complaint do not amount
to a violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act because Cendant is under no
obligation at this stage to file any registration statement or prospectus in
respect of the shares it will issue in connection with any second step merger.
See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 254 (6th Cir. 1985) ("'[A] tender offer and
subsequent merger are distinct acts with separate concerns toward which the
25
securities laws and SEC rules are directed in their regulatory schemes,' and
that it [is] 'entirely appropriate to consider each step in "'a transaction
separately.'"), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); SEC Release No. 34-14699,
[3 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P. 24,284 H at 17,775-5 (Apr. 24,
1978) (the disclosure required by the Williams Act to be made by a bidder in a
cash tender offer concerning a subsequent statutory merger "should not be
deemed to constitute an 'offer to sell' ... and should not therefore require
the filing of a registration statement ... prior to the commencement of such
tender offer"); see also American General Corp. v. NLT Corp., 1982 WL 1332 *22
(S.D. Tex.) ("NLT is not required to disclose the precise terms of the
security it proposes to issue in a merger with American General because a
tender offer and subsequent merger are separate transactions and therefore
'full merger prospectus disclosure is not required at the tender offer
stage.'") (citing Sheinberg v. Flour Corp., 514 F. Supp. 133, 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)). Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants respectfully
request that their Motion to Dismiss be granted.
Of Counsel: SHUTTS & BOWEN LLP
Jonathan J. Lerner 1500 Miami Center
Samuel Kadet 201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Seth M. Schwartz Miami, Florida 33131
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, Telephone: 305-358-6300
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP Facsimile: 305-381-9982
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Telephone: 212-735-3000
Facsimile: 212-735-2000
By: /s/ Robert T. Wright, Jr.
---------------------------
26
Dated: February 13, 1998 Robert T. Wright, Jr.
Florida Bar No. 185525
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Cendant Corporation and
Season Acquisition Corp.
27
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum of Law has been served this 13TH day of FEBRUARY, 1998,
upon the following:
VIA HAND-DELIVERY TO: VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL TO:
Lewis F. Murphy, Esq. Richard H. Klapper, Esq.
Steel, Hector & Davis LLP SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
Co-Counsel for AIG and AIGF Co-Counsel for AIG and AIGF
200 South Biscayne Boulevard 125 Broad Street
First Union Financial Center, Suite 4000 New York, New York 10004-2498
Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Facsimile: (212) 558-4000
---------------------------------
28
Exhibit A
2/12/98
Steve Kernkraut (212) 272-4305
Joe Buckley (212) 272-4263
Subject: Company Update
Industry: Retailing; Consumer Services
BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.
EQUITY RESEARCH
Cendant Corp. (CD - 37) - Buy
A Lot of Noise Around American Bankers Bid
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** American International Group filed a lawsuit in Florida late last week
against Cendant related to its proposal to acquire American Bankers Group
Insurance, Inc. for $58 per share. Cendant had previously filed a suit against
AIG seeking to eliminate certain provisions of AIG's definitive agreement to
acquire American Bankers at $47 per share.
*** American Bankers announced that its board was unable to take a position on
the Cendant proposal because it was unable to access certain aspects of the
proposal and that ABI would request a hearing with the Florida insurance
regulatory authorities.
*** From a Cendant perspective, we think that nothing has changed. The company
proposed to buy ABI for $58 in cash and stock, offering a 23% premium to the
$47 per share in AIG's definitive agreement to acquire ABI. ABI's principal
business is the direct marketing of credit insurance, a business which Cendant
management believes it can grow substantially by leveraging its existing
direct marketing expertise, and distribution channels.
*** We continue to recommend purchase of CD shares. As investors become more
familiar with this newly created $30 billion+ market capitalization company
that we expect to grow at a 25% rate, we anticipate a higher valuation for the
stock. We refer interested clients to our recently published (dated January
10, 1998) comprehensive report on Cendant for detailed analysis.
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARKET CAPITALIZATION $33.750 (MM)
EARNINGS 01 Mar 02 Jun 03 Dec 04 Year P/E
Current 1996 $0.14 $0.17 $0.20 $0.19 $0.70
Current 1997 $0.19A $0.25A $0.29A $0.28A $1.00A 37.5x
Current 1998 $0.25E $0.31E $0.37E $0.35E $1.28E 29.3x
Current 1999 $1.62E 22.8x
There has recently been a flurry of news concerning the competitive bidding
situation for American Banker's Group. The news included a lawsuit by AIG
against Cendant, a statement that ABI's board could not take a position on
their Cendant bid, a full page Wall Street Journal ad on Friday from AIG that
heralded that AIG's $47 per share bid was superior to Cendant's $58 for a
number of reasons and an answering full page ad in Tuesday's New York Times
from Cendant. The AIG ad seemed to principally address ABI's employees. The
bottom line message of the Cendant ad was that $58 is higher than $47.
Despite this flurry of activity, nothing has really changed Cendant is
proposing to acquire American Bankers at $58 per share in cash (the cash
portion is reflected in a tender offer to acquire up to a $14 equity stake in
ABI at $58 per share and stock in an unsolicited bid. ABI and AIG had reached
a definitive agreement in December whereby AIG would acquire ABI for $47 per
share in cash and stock. This definitive agreement includes provisions that
prohibit ABI's board from discussion with other
potential buyers of the company for 120 days and that grant AIG an option to
acquire 19.9% of American Bankers stock if another bidder emerges. Cendant is
seeking in litigation to negate these two provision of the agreement. To
exercise the option provision, AIG would need regulatory approval.
Cendant is seeking ABI because it believes that it can significantly grow its
business-- the direct marketing of credit insurance-- through its existing
direct marketing expertise and distribution channels. From a Cendant
perspective, it would be a classic case of an acquisition with "comparative
advantage"-- i.e., where the core competencies of Cendant substantially
enhance the value of the acquired business. The company believes that over a
2-3 year time frame, there is an incremental $140 million of pretax earnings
that can be derived from ABI principally by growing the business. The targeted
cost savings component of this $140 million is only $10 million. Cendant
indicates that it can double ABI's response rate in its direct marketing
efforts from the current level of about 8%. The company has historically
achieved this rate of response in a number of its direct marketing programs.
We believe that the growth synergy would include marketing ABI's credit
insurance product through other Cendant channels, as well as marketing other
Cendant products to ABI customers.
Both AIG and Cendant will need regulatory approvals by insurance commissions in
six states. The commissions' role is to protect the policy holders. Claims in
the credit insurance business are relatively small because they represent
credit card balances or other installment debt. This should be a non-issue for
each of the bidders. AIG may appear to have an advantage in the regulatory
hearings because of its stature in the insurance industry. But as Cendant
pointedly notes in its newspaper ad, AIG has an aggressive reputation in terms
of addressing (or not addressing) policy claims. The Cendant ad cites specific
Wall Street Journal articles with direct quotes criticizing AIG's policy
claims management. This suggests that from a regulatory perspective, the
companies should be considered on equal footing, both in terms of probability
of approval and timing.
From a broader financial perspective, AIG is heralding its AAA-rating. But
Cendant is also quite strong financially with an A-rating; the company notes
that this is a higher debt rating than is currently enjoyed by American
Bankers. Excluding assets and matched liabilities of its management programs.
Cendant has long term debt of $1.3 billion (including about $800 million of
convertible debt) and shareholders' equity of $4.5 billion. The Company, in
our view, has substantial unused debt capacity. In addition, we forecast
Cendant's free cash flow at $1.3 billion for 1998 and $1.7 billion for 1999.
In our check within the insurance industry, we find that Cendant's financial
position would qualify it as a buyer from a regulatory perspective. Again, we
conclude that both companies are qualified, serious potential buyers. In fact,
because the deal is a cash/stock combination. Cendant may be better-positioned
because its stock carries a higher multiple than that of AIG.
Companies Mentioned: CD. ABI. AIG.
Within the past three years, Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc. or one of its affiliates
was the manager (co-manager) of a public offering of securities of this
company and/or has performed other banking services for which it has received
a fee.
A managing director of Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc. is a director of this company.
First Call Corporation - all rights reserved. 617/345-2500
Exhibit B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
UNION PACIFIC RESOURCES GROUP,
INC.
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:97-CV-509-Y
PENNZOIL COMPANY
ORDER
-----
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' September 8, 1997
Motion to Dismiss and/or Deny Pennzoil's Application for Preliminary
Injunction as moot. Even though the parties dispute whether or not the
disclosures Plaintiffs made on September 8th were required, for the present
purposes because the September 8th amendment to Plaintiffs' schedule 14D-1
contains the disclosures Pennzoil sought by way of injunction to require
Plaintiffs to make, it is not necessary for the Court to make any finding that
Plaintiffs did, or did not, violate the Act nor whether the disclosures which
were made were required. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss and/or
Deny [document number 247] is hereby GRANTED, in that Pennzoil's August 11th
Application for Preliminary Injunction [document 110] is hereby denied as
MOOT.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED September 10, 1997
/s/ Terry R. Means
----------------------------
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
In re: Application for Approval of the Acquisition
of a Controlling Interest (Form D14-918) filed by
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, and AIGF, INC., a Florida corporation,
Relating to American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida,
American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida and
Voyager Service Warranties, Inc., Domestic Insurers
- --------------------------------------------------- /
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF SEASON'S
PETITIONS FOR HEARING AND TO INTERVENE AND CONSOLIDATE
Cendant Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary Season
Acquisition Corp. (collectively, "Season") hereby submit this reply memorandum
in further support of their applications (1) for a hearing on AIG's Form A
application, (2) to intervene as a parties in any and all administrative
proceedings instituted before the Department in connection with the proposed
acquisition by AIG and AIGF of American Bankers and AIG's resulting acquisition
of control of the Domes tic Insurers and (3) to consolidate the AIG proceedings
with proceedings instituted by Season relating to the acquisition of control of
the Domestic Insurers.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Department now faces for the first time competing -- and,
we respectfully submit, mutually exclusive -- applications for approval to
acquire a domestic insurer. Neither Season nor AIG should receive any advantage
as a result
of the timing of the Department's action. Florida law requires the Department
to follow an even-handed and level process that will be fair to American
Bankers' shareholders and policyholders, to the public, and to Season and AIG
as well. This process will also allow the Department to give thorough
consideration to the applications - free from concern that it will
disadvantage the applicants or American Bankers' shareholders or policyholders.
Fortunately, there is clear Florida statutory, regulatory and
case law authority to guide the Department and the interested parties through
the approval proceedings. A review of this authority demonstrates that the
Department should schedule a hearing on AIG's Form A application, and
consolidate Season's own application with the AIG proceedings, in order to
allow all parties whose substantial interests will be affected by the
Department's actions to participate in and aid this consideration. Neither side
should be permitted to manipulate the Department's review process for
advantage. Season does not seek to do so and AIG's effort to do so - in order
to overcome the substantially inferior economics of its proposal should be
rejected.
A lawsuit filed by Season currently pending in federal
district court in Florida alleges, among other things, that the AIG/American
Bankers merger agreement is violative of Florida law because in pursuing the
merger with AIG American Bankers' directors, aided and abetted by AIG,
abandoned their duties to American
2
Bankers' shareholders by accepting AIG's inadequate offer while at the same
time agreeing to a number of provisions designed to frustrate the attempt of
any competing bidder to acquire American Bankers at a higher price. Moreover,
AIG's Form A application raises a number of serious issues that will require
close scrutiny by the Department before it acts on AIG's application. For
example:
AIG has not been forthright by failing to disclose that it is
controlled by its chairman, Maurice Greenberg, through a
number of off-shore companies;
AIG has maintained a close association with several former
senior officials of the bankrupt Drexel Burnham Lambert to
speculate in high risk junk bonds and other exotic financial
products;
Greenberg has caused AIG to engage in highly unusual
and unseemly transactions to benefit one of his rela-
tives; and
AIG has frequently come under fire for its business
practices, which have been described by one regulator as
"repulsive."
These issues, which are more fully described in Season's opening brief in
support of its motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by AIG, will be aired before
the federal district court in Florida at a hearing on that motion. (A copy of
Season's opening brief is attached hereto as Exhibit A). The illegality of the
merger agreement and the issues raised by AIG's Form A application warrant a
hearing by the Department on AIG's Form A.
3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
AIG's efforts to preclude both intervention and consolidation
are part of a desperate campaign to prevent the Department from evaluating the
true facts surrounding AIG's attempted acquisition, to manipulate the
regulatory review process to further AIG's efforts to obtain American Bankers
on the cheap and to thwart Season's superior competing offer. The public
interest plainly warrants a level regulatory playing field in which neither
side is able to extract any advantage based simply on the procedures used by
the Department. AIG is unable to demonstrate any prejudice if Season intervenes
or if the proceedings are consolidated. Moreover, it cannot minimize the
obvious benefits to the public which will flow from Season's active
participation.
Intervention is warranted because resolution of AIG's
application before Season's will cause immediate irreparable injury to Season.
AIG has intentionally hidden this immediate impact from the Department by
failing to acknowledge that (1) it seeks approval to exercise its option to
purchase 19.9% of American Bankers' outstanding common stock, (2) exercise of
the option is subject to no condition other than regulatory approval and (3)
the option is solely and specifically designed to injure Season and any other
competing bidder for American Bankers. Further, approval of AIG's application
to acquire American Bankers will advantage AIG in the marketplace, to Season's
corresponding disadvantage. AIG asks the
4
Department to ignore the plain meaning of the controlling intervention
statutes, which grant Season standing to intervene both as a shareholder of and
competing bidder for American Bankers. AIG's tactics must fail.
Also flawed is AIG's argument against consolidation, which,
like intervention, is mandated by statute here. As part of its campaign to
acquire American Bankers, AIG is seeking to manipulate the Department's
procedures to delay approval of Season's Form A. Consolidation will eliminate
this inequity and will thus result in equality in the marketplace and fairness
to the public. This Department is now adjudicating a contested proceeding which
demands its decisive response. AIG's contrived procedural arguments are
insufficient to deny Season access to these proceedings on the basis of
timeliness, particularly as Season has, in all respects, acted with alacrity
and truthfulness before the Department.
SEASON HAS STANDING TO INTERVENE
IN THE AIG FORM A PROCEEDINGS
Because Season will suffer immediate injury if the AIG Form A
is approved and because its interests are of the type and nature that Form A
proceedings are designed to protect, Season has standing to intervene in AIG's
Form A proceedings. See Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental
Regulation, 406 So.2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, Freeport
Sulphur Co. v. Agrico Chemical Co., 415 So.2d 1359 (1982) and rev. denied,
Sulfur Terminals Co. v. Agrico Chemical Co., 415 So.2d 1361 (1982).
5
A. ACTION ON AIG'S APPLICATION WILL CAUSE IMMEDIATE INJURY TO
SEASON
In arguing that Season will not be injured by the
Department's action on the AIG Form A, AIG claims that injury to Season may
only result from American Bankers' shareholders' potential approval of the
AIG/American Bankers merger, and not from any action by the Department. This
argument fails for two reasons.
The first reason is born of AIG's own disingenuousness. AIG
states that "[h]ere, the Department can take only one of two actions: approve
or disapprove AIG's application." This is simply untrue. Nowhere to be found in
AIG's argument on injury is even a single mention of a third possible
Department action -- approval of AIG's exercise of its "lock up" option to
purchase 19.9% of American Bankers' outstanding common stock at a substantial
discount from the current market price. This omission is not, however,
surprising. Exercise of the option is not subject to a vote of American
Bankers' shareholders. The only barrier to AIG's acquisition of these shares is
regulatory approval, which AIG seeks from the Department. AIG cannot in good
faith argue to the Department that its action on AIG's request will not have
direct consequences, but will instead be one small and insignificant step in a
process ultimately to be decided in another forum at another time. Deprived of
this argument, AIG purposely stands mute on the issue of the lock up option and
attempts to direct the Department's attention elsewhere.
6
AIG's request to exercise the lock up option is specifically
designed to harm Season, and, if approved, would indeed immediately and
directly do so. By AIG's own admission, the lock up option has no purpose other
than to injure Season or any other party who seeks to disrupt AIG's sweetheart
deal with American Bankers by making a competing bid. In a Form S-4 filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, AIG has stated that its exercise of the
lock up option "may delay or make more difficult an acquisition of American
Bankers by a person other than AIG," "could have the effect of making an
acquisition of American Bankers by a third party more costly" and "could also
jeopardize the ability of a third party to acquire American Bankers in a
transaction accounted for as a pooling of interests." Because it cannot now
disclaim injury to Season in the face of its own explication of precisely how
Season will be injured by exercise of the 19.9% option, AIG chooses to say
nothing. A refusal to acknowledge the threat of immediate injury, however, does
not remove the threat.
Second, the argument that the Department's action on the AIG
Form A will not injure Season because only a shareholder vote can do so is
equally flawed. AIG attempts to play both ends against the middle, asserting to
the Department that its action on AIG's Form A proceeding will have no impact
upon Season, let alone a
7
harmful one, while at the same time seeking to convince American Bankers' share
holders that regulatory approval is crucial to the success of any merger and
that AIG is assured of receiving speedy approval while Season is unlikely to
receive approval at all.
In AIG's view, the Department's action on the AIG Form A is
entirely divorced from any shareholder vote on its proposed merger. In essence,
AIG seeks to convince the Department that its decision on the AIG Form A is
basically irrelevant to AIG's attempt to merge with American Bankers, and that
the success of the proposed merger -- and the resulting injury to Season --
lies entirely within the control of American Bankers' shareholders. Under this
theory, the Department is absolved of any responsibility for or authority over
AIG's attempt to acquire American Bankers on the cheap through means that
violate Florida law.
Apparently unable or unwilling to compete with Season's offer
in terms of price, however, AIG has now adopted a strategy of seeking to
convince American Bankers' shareholders to vote in favor of its far inferior
offer by very publicly attempting to convey the impression that the
Department's approval of its Form A is a virtual rubber stamp while Season
faces supposedly insurmountable hurdles in its own attempt to gain regulatory
approval. This strategy is designed to coerce shareholders to vote in favor of
AIG's economically inferior offer by creating the perception that the
Department will delay approval of Season's application so that
8
the uncertainties will cause shareholders to forego Season's favorable
transaction. For example, AIG has declared in a lawsuit filed in federal court
in Florida that it "is much further along than [Season in] efforts to obtain
[regulatory] approval," that it is "likely to secure prompt insurance
regulatory approval" and that Season will "find it difficult, if not
impossible, to secure regulatory approval." AIG complaint, dated February 5,
1998, at P. P. 24, 25 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit B). Not only are these
statements belied by the facts that Cendant has already been approved by the
insurance departments of New York and Colorado to own and operate insurance
companies and has been approved to participate in other highly regulated
industries, but they also make clear that AIG considers regulatory approval of
its Form A an essential (if not the essential) element of its effort to gain
shareholder support for its proposed merger with American Bankers. In light of
this conduct, AIG's characterization of the Department's action on its Form A
as inconsequential to the ultimate success or failure of its and Season's bids
for American Bankers comes with particular ill grace.
AIG's public proclamations of the importance of obtaining
regulatory approvals only serve to highlight precisely what Season has already
demonstrated that approval of AIG's Form A would give AIG a substantial
advantage in the marketplace while placing Season at a corresponding and
immediate disadvantage. Given AIG's conduct to date, it is a virtual certainty
that it would attempt to use any
9
approval of its Form A to convince American Bankers' shareholders that its
offer for American Bankers is somehow superior to Season's. If the Department
approves AIG's Form A, Season and American Bankers' shareholders and
policyholders will suffer immediate harm.
The cases upon which AIG relies are not to the contrary. For
example, in Village Park Mobile Home Ass'n v. Department of Business
Regulation, 506 S0.2d 426, 428, 430 (1st DCA 1987), the court held that the
petitioners could not be harmed by approval of a mobile park owner's prospectus
because, by statute, the prospectus was merely a disclosure document, approval
of which would not prevent the petitioners from enforcing any of their
substantive rights under the Florida Mobile Home Act. In contrast, Season will
immediately be injured by any action by the Department on AIG's requests for
approval to exercise the 19.9% option and to acquire control of American
Bankers. Moreover, Season has no opportunity to protect against this injury
except through participation in proceedings on the AIG Form A.
The Village Park court further held that the petitioners'
allegation of a potential decline in the marketability of their mobile homes
was too speculative to grant standing in the absence of evidence that any
mobile homes had been offered for sale. Id. at 430. Here, however, Season and
AIG are both current bidders for American Bankers, and AIG itself has
emphasized that exercise of the lock up option
10
and receipt of regulatory approval are both crucial aspects of this contest.
Finally, the Village Park court based its decision on the fact that the Mobile
Home Act "contemplated exclusive participation in the prospectus review process
by park owners." Id. The statute under which Season seeks intervention,
however, contemplates precisely the opposite. Section 628.461(5)(a), Florida
Statutes, expressly permits participation in Form A proceedings of any
"substantially affected party," not merely the applicant itself.(1)
- --------
(1) AIG's reliance on AmeriSteel Corp. v. Clark, 691 So.2d 473 (Fla.
1997), is equally unavailing. AmeriSteel sought to intervene in a proceeding
before the Public Service Commission for approval of a territorial agreement
between two electric companies that would have resulted in no change to
AmeriSteel's service. Because AmeriSteel's "corporate interests [would] remain
completely unaffected" by the Commission's action, the court held that
AmeriSteel lacked standing to intervene. Id. at 478. So too with International
Jai-Alai Players Ass'n v. Florida Pari-Mutual Commission, 561 So.2d 1224 (3rd
DCA 1990), where an association of jai-alai players sought to intervene in an
application by fronton owners to change playing dates, alleging that the change
might somehow affect a labor dispute between the association and the fronton
owners. The court held that this vague allegation of potential future injury
was too remote to support standing. Id. at 1225-26. Here, Season's interests
will be immediately affected, and injured, if the Department approves AIG's
request to exercise the 19.9% option and if the Department approves AIG's
application to acquire American Bankers. Thus, this situation is readily
distinguishable from those presented to the courts in AmeriSteel and
International Jai-Alai Players..
11
B. SEASON'S SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE STATUTES
GOVERNING FORM A PROCEEDINGS
1. SEASON HAS EXPRESS STATUTORY STANDING TO INTERVENE
AS A SHAREHOLDER OF AMERICAN BANKERS
Section 628.461(3), Florida Statutes, requires the Department
to determine the "character, experience, ability and other qualifications" of
AIG and its controlling persons "for the protection of the policyholders and
shareholders of [American Bankers] and the public." (emphasis added) AIG states
that the Department should ignore this unambiguous legislative mandate to
protect Season's interests as a shareholder, advancing the tepid argument that
this directive is "an oversight" because the Florida Legislature simply forgot
to remove the word "share holders" from Section 628.461 when amending that
statute in 1985. The Legislature has, however, amended Section 628.461 ten
times since 1985, and each time it elected to leave undisturbed the requirement
that the Department consider the interests of a domestic insurer's shareholders
when reviewing a Form A application. Had the Legislature merely committed "an
oversight" in 1985, it would have rectified its error in the ensuing thirteen
years. It did not, and the Department must give effect to the law as it stands,
notwithstanding AIG's desperate attempt to rewrite the statute.(2)
- --------
(2) AIG's reliance on The News Corporation Limited v. Gunter,
Slip. Op. No. 84-3278-WS (N.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 1984), does not advance its
position. As AIG admits, the Legislature was well aware of the import of that
case when it amended Section 628.461 in 1985, and when it amended the statute
ten times thereafter. The Legislature took the action it saw fit in response to
that case. In so doing, it deter mined that it was appropriate to require the
Department to consider the interests of shareholders when reviewing Form A
applications, and it thereby further determined that shareholders have standing
to intervene in proceedings on these applications.
12
It is axiomatic that the plain language of a statute must be
followed. State of Florida v. Marks, 698 So.2d 533, 540 (Fla. 1997) ("Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous . . . the language should be
given effect without resort to extrinsic guides to construction."); In re
McCollam, 612 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1993); Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window
Co., Inc., 698 So.2d 570, 571 (1st DCA 1997). The Department is not free to
disregard its statutory mandate and, as AIG asks it to do, instead legislate
changes to this mandate. Department of Transportation v. Pan American Constr.
Co., 338 So.2d 1291, 1293-94 (1st DCA 1976).
2. SEASON HAS STANDING TO INTERVENE AS A COMPETING ACQUIRER
AIG also challenges Season's standing as a competing
acquirer, while at the same time conceding that the Department's action on the
AIG Form A will injure Season. AIG acknowledges that Season will suffer harm if
AIG's proposed merger succeeds, but advances the argument that the threatened
injury is economic and thus insufficient to confer standing, and that this
economic injury is not protected by the Florida change of control statutes. AIG
is wrong on both counts. Economic
13
injury suffered by a competitor has been held by the Florida courts to be
sufficient to confer standing on a party to intervene in administrative
proceedings. In Charter Medical-Southeast, Inc. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, 495 So.2d 759, 764 (1st DCA 1986), the court held that
a proposed intervenor's potential $1.6 million loss as a result of the
department's action was, in and of itself, sufficient injury to give it
standing. Significantly, the court declared that a case relied upon by AIG,
North Ridge General Hospital v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 478 So.2d 1138 (1st DCA
1985), is not to the contrary because the petitioner in North Ridge, unlike the
petitioner in Charter (and unlike Season here), was not an affected person as
defined by statute. Id. at 764 n.6.
Season's interests as a competing acquirer, notwithstanding
AIG's contrary and unsupported musings, are indeed protected by statute.
Section 628.461(9) clearly states that the Department's approval of a Form A
application is not to serve as a recommendation of an acquisition. Although AIG
seeks to characterize this section as merely a penal provision, its manifest
intent is to prevent the Department from favoring one applicant over another.
If the Department here acts on AIG's Form A without the participation of Season
in the proceedings and without simultaneous consideration of Season's
application, the Department will de facto recommend AIG's proposed acquisition
over Season by giving AIG an advantage in the marketplace. Indeed, AIG has
demonstrated its intent to characterize any
14
Departmental approval of its application as a recommendation of its offer by
publicly trumpeting its conclusion that it is a vastly superior candidate than
Season to acquire American Bankers, and that it expects to receive only pro
forma review by regulators whereas it believes that Season will be subjected to
rigorous and skeptical review. AIG further predicts that Season may ultimately
not secure regulatory approval. The only manner in which the Department can
prevent AIG from continuing and intensifying this campaign is to place AIG and
Season on equal footing by permitting Season to participate in AIG's Form A
Proceedings and by hearing and deciding both applications simultaneously.
Because any other result will cause injury to Season of the very nature that
Section 628.461(9) seeks to preclude, Season has standing. See Fairbanks, Inc.
v. Department of Transportation, 635 So.2d 58, 59 (1st DCA 1994) (where
requested department action would contravene legislative purpose, party who
would be injured thereby had standing to intervene).
CONSOLIDATION AND A HEARING SHOULD BE ORDERED
A. THE DEPARTMENT HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE THE AIG
AND SEASON FORM A PROCEEDINGS, AND SHOULD DEFER ANY HEARING
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE RESULTS OF AMERICAN BANKERS' SHAREHOLDERS'
VOTE ON THE AIG MERGER ARE KNOWN
Significantly, AIG does not claim that it would be prejudiced
by consolidation. Instead, it argues that the Department has no power to
consolidate these proceedings. AIG's assertion that "there is no statutory,
rule or case authority
15
for consolidation" of the AIG Form A proceedings with Season's Form A proceed-
ings is incorrect, and AIG's attempt to convince the Department to adopt a rule
requiring common issues of law and fact before consolidating proceedings is
simply wrong. Florida's Administrative Procedure Act does in fact provide for
the Department to consolidate these proceedings.
Section 120.54(10), Florida Statutes (1995), states that
the appropriate model rules shall be the rules of procedure for
each agency subject to this act to the extent that each agency
does not adopt a specific rule of procedure covering the subject
matter . . .(3) (emphasis added)
Because the Department does not have its own rule on consolidation, Season's
request is governed by Model Rule 28-5.106, which states that the Department
may consolidate matters "which involve similar issues of law or fact" if it
appears that consolidation would promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of the proceedings and would not unduly prejudice the rights of a
party. (emphasis added) Thus the rule does not require, as AIG has suggested,
that the agency must determine
- --------
(3) In 1996, this section was superseded by Section 120.54(5), Florida
Statutes (1997), which authorized the creation of Uniform Rules of Procedure to
replace the Model Rules. Agencies have until July 1, 1998 to comply with the
Uniform Rules. The list of those agencies now complying with the Uniform Rules
published by the Secretary of State in the Florida Administrative Weekly does
not presently include the Department. If, however, the Department has begun to
follow the Uniform Rules the result here is the same, as Uniform Rule
28-106.108 is substantially identical to Model Rule 28-5.106.
16
that there are common issues of both law and fact before consolidating
proceedings. Instead, the Department must only find similar legal or factual
issues and that consolidation would promote justice, efficiency and reduction
of expense.
The AIG and Season Form A applications raise numerous similar
factual and legal issues. By way of example, and without limitation, under
Section 628.461(7) the Department must consider in reviewing both the AIG and
Season Form A applications:
(1) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on
American Bankers' corporate structure and
financial strength;
(2) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on
American Bankers' policyholders and the public;
(3) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on the
Florida insurance market; and
(4) the impact of any proposed changes to the
management and control of American Bankers.
It would be inappropriate and an inefficient use of the Department's resources
to perform each of these analyses twice, in separate proceedings, particularly
since consideration of one application before the other would have the effect
of favoring one applicant over another.
Moreover, this consolidated hearing should not be held until
after the results of the vote of American Bankers' shareholders (scheduled on
March 4 and 6,
17
1998 for preferred and common shareholders, respectively) are known.
Shareholder disapproval of the AIG/American Bankers merger - a result that is
not unlikely given that AIG offers American Bankers' shareholders $500 million
less than does Season - would effectively moot AIG's request for approval to
acquire American Bankers. In such an event, it would be a waste of the
Department's resources, as well as those of all who will participate in a
hearing on AIG's Form A Application, to have conducted the hearing. On the
other hand, there exist no compelling reasons to conduct a hearing before the
results of the shareholder vote are known. Receipt of regulatory approval by
AIG is not required before American Bankers' shareholders vote on the merger
proposal. Moreover, the absence of regulatory approval at the time of the
shareholder vote will not have any impact upon AIG's ultimate success or
failure in its attempt to acquire American Bankers. Shareholder and regulatory
approval are separate conditions of the merger, each entirely distinct from the
other. If the AIG merger is approved by American Bankers' shareholders, AIG
will have satisfied one condition to the merger. The Department can then
conduct a hearing on AIG's Form A Application to determine if approval should
be granted and a further condition of the merger be satisfied. If the AIG
merger does not receive shareholder approval, however, the need for a hearing
by the Department will be obviated.
Where there is a question regarding the legality or propriety
of a proposed merger that is subject to a shareholder vote, as Season's lawsuit
challenging
18
the AIG/American Bankers illegal merger agreement establishes there is here,
deferral of any adjudicatory hearing on these issues pending the outcome of the
shareholder vote is appropriate to avoid the conduct of an unnecessary hearing.
See, e.g., D&N Financial Corp. v. RCM Partners Ltd. Partnership, 735 F. Supp.
1242, 1253 (D. Del. 1990) (court permitted vote based upon allegedly misleading
proxies to proceed where it could set aside vote if necessary and proxies were
found misleading); Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1197, 1205
(S.D. Fla. 1983) (where shareholder vote could result in rejection of
challenged merger and thus moot plaintiff's claim for relief, and where relief
would be available to plaintiff in the event of shareholder approval, it was
appropriate to allow vote to proceed); FMC Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 318, 322 (D. Del. 1982) (court denied request for injunction against vote
based upon allegedly misleading proxies where it could, set aside shareholder
vote if it determined, after vote, that proxy materials were misleading);
Wetter v. Ceasars World, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.N.J. 1982) (same);
Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 472 F. Supp. 1017, 1021-22 (D. Del. 1979) (same);
Clairedale Enterprises, Inc. v. C.I. Realty Investors, 423 F. Supp. 261, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same).
B. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOT BE AN ACCESSORY TO INJUSTICE
AIG and American Bankers are manipulating this Department's
procedures to gain advantage in the marketplace. In response to Season's
request to
19
level the playing field through consolidation, AIG coyly states that "the
field's unevenness was neither the Department's doing nor AIG's doing" and
offers the non sequitur that therefore "neutrality is required not only by
Florida Administrative law but also by federal law."
AIG's true goal here is anything but neutrality. AIG has
filed a document with the insurance departments of all six of American Bankers'
domiciliary states recklessly impugning Season's financial status, competence
to operate an insurer and the integrity of Cendant's President and Chief
Executive Officer, Henry R. Silverman.(4) Significantly, AIG has filed this
document in its own application proceedings (proceedings from which it is
fighting here to exclude Season) rather than Season's, where its allegations
are more properly raised but would be subject to cross-examination and
refutation by Season.
AIG also attempts to misuse both the Department's
confidentiality policy and neutral hearing procedure to seize an improper
advantage over Season. The Department's policy is to treat each Form A filing
on a "confidential" basis.
- --------
(4) This is not the first time AIG has resorted to scurrilous attacks as
a weapon in an acquisition context. Recently, in July 1997, the California
Department of Insurance investigated AIG for making false statements intended
to undermine the rehabilitation of Golden Eagle Insurance Co. after its bid to
acquire that company was rejected by a court. The investigation also extended
to AIG's business practices in California, which had been the subject of
numerous complaints from consumers. See Elizabeth Festa, AIG Becomes New
Quackenbush Target, Insurance Accountant, July 21, 1997 (copy attached as
Exhibit C).
20
This policy of confidentiality has, however, been vitiated by AIG and American
Bankers because American Bankers has, in the merger agreement, contracted to
provide AIG with copies of Season's Form A. Although AIG has now agreed to
exchange Form A applications with Season, this recent development does not
obviate the prejudice already inflicted upon Season through AIG's early access
to Season's Form A.
AIG and American Bankers have further agreed to use Section
628.461's "neutral" hearing procedures to secure unfair advantage for AIG. The
statute, which allows a target company to invoke a proceeding to stop the
ninety day clock for approving a Form A, contemplates the exercise of that
power by a target company that is acting independently with regard to the
proposed takeover. Al though the right to such a proceeding is rarely exercised
by an insurer, American Bankers, by contracting in the merger agreement to use
its "best efforts" to ensure the success of its merger with AIG, has
effectively bound itself to do all it can to derail Season's bid, including by
invoking its purported right to a hearing on Season's Form A. Merger Agreement
at P. 6.5(b).(5)
- --------
(5) American Bankers has reportedly requested a hearing on Season's
Form A application. Leslie Scism and Emily Nelson, AIG Assails Cendant's
Reputation In Battle for American Bankers, The Wall Street Journal, February 9,
1998, at p. B5 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit D). This provides a further
reason for the Department to consolidate the proceedings here and hold one
hearing. As discussed further below, AIG has a contractual agreement with
American Bankers that permits it to control American Bankers' conduct in this
hearing. It is only fair for the Department to consider AIG's Form A in the
same hearing, and to allow Season the same opportunity as AIG has to comment on
its competitor's application.
21
Significantly, American Bankers has also agreed that it and
AIG shall have the right to review in advance, and to the
extent practicable each will consult the other on, all the
information relating to [AIG] or the [American Bankers] . . .
that appear in any filing made with, or written materials
submitted to, any third party and/or any Governmental Entity
in connection with the Merger or the other transactions
contemplated by this Agreement." (emphasis added)
Merger Agreement at P. 6.5. This language not only gives AIG a contractual
right to obtain Season's Form A from American Bankers, but it also effectively
allowed AIG to participate in (or, as seems more likely, to demand) the
decision by American Bankers to request a hearing on Season's Form A.
This suspect agreement is not the first indication that AIG
is acting in concert with American Bankers to frustrate those who would make a
higher bid for American Bankers. As set out more fully in Season's complaint in
the federal court litigation (a copy of which is attached to Season's original
petition), the merger agreement also contains an impressive, and improper,
array of measures designed to frustrate more attractive bids for American
Bankers, including, among many others, the 19.9% lock-up option.
22
The results of American Bankers' contractual obligations are
demonstrable here. By demanding a hearing in connection with Season's Form A
and (presumably) failing to demand a similar hearing in connection with AIG's
Form A, American Bankers is clearly assisting AIG in its attempt to gain a
market advantage over Season by seeking to delay approval of Season's Form A.
Further, American Bankers has agreed to consult with AIG on any action American
Bankers takes with respect to Season's Form A. Simply put, American Bankers has
contracted to be AIG's puppet in AIG's attempt to defeat Season's superior bid.
In light of its contractual arrangement with American
Bankers, AIG's feigned outrage at what it claims to be Season's failure to
respect the required "neutrality" in administrative proceedings is transparent.
AIG and American Bankers have distorted this principle in order to advance
their own ends and to bring harm to Season. Justice requires that their
manipulation be brought to a halt, which can only be accomplished through
consolidation and simultaneous hearing.
C. COMPETING APPLICATIONS WARRANT CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation and joint decision where two entities are
competing for one mutually exclusive goal is required by Ashbacker Radio v.
Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), and its progeny. AIG
mistakenly argues that Ashbacker does not apply because the Season and AIG
applications are not mutually exclusive (i.e., the department can authorize one
or many more applications
23
by one or many purchasers to acquire American Bankers). This simplistic
argument blindly misses the point of Ashbacker and ignores the circumstances
here. Because AIG has transformed departmental approval into the sine qua non
of the race to acquire American Bankers, the approval of either acquirer may
well be a de facto mutually exclusive decision by the Department. There is only
one American Bankers, and whoever seizes the advantage in the marketplace will
likely succeed in acquiring it. Season asks only that the Department not allow
AIG to obtain unfair advantage in the marketplace, so that any advantage to
Season or AIG will be based solely on the merits of their offers. No substitute
is available to a party left behind in the regulatory process. Thus, as AIG
concedes, the teaching of Ashbacker and it progeny is
that where two bona fide applications for administrative
approval are mutually exclusive, the grant of one without a
hearing to both, deprives the loser of the hearing to which
he is entitled.
HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, 599 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1992).
D. CONSOLIDATION WILL PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH ESSENTIAL
INFORMATION
Consolidation of the AIG and Season proceedings is necessary
to provide both the Department and the public with all essential information on
the Form A applications. As matters stand now, AIG has the contractual right to
restrict
24
American Bankers' freedom independently to assist regulators in reviewing AIG's
filings, assess regulatory requests for information, and provide information to
regulators. Currently, American Bankers will not contest information in AIG's
filings, nor will it to volunteer information to regulators that might be
damaging to AIG, all because it has agreed to use its "best efforts" to promote
and consummate its proposed merger with AIG.
For example, AIG states in its Texas Form A, under the
heading "Future Plans for the Insurer" that "AIG presently intends that the
insurer continue its business in the manner currently conducted and with its
present management . . . ." Season assumes that a similar representation is
made in the AIG's Florida Form A filing. However, as American Bankers well
knows, the achievement of future "expense savings" at American Bankers was a
key factor in AIG's decision to agree to the AIG/American Bankers merger. AIG
reveals in its proxy statement, released on January 30, 1998, that
"[i]n June of 1997, Mr. Greenberg [AIG's Chairman and CEO]
expressed skepticism concerning a possible . . . business
combination with American Bankers because AIG . . . would
realize an insufficient rate of return on its investment . .
. . Soon thereafter, however, Mr. Greenberg requested . . . a
study [of] possible synergies and expense savings. . . .
AIG Proxy Statement at 22.
25
The proxy statement discusses the search for expense savings at some length.(6)
American Bankers will not contest AIG's Form A on the truth or falsity of AIG's
stated plans for operating American Bankers. On the other hand, Season can
easily assist the Department in probing this point through consolidated
hearings. Thus, to fairly assess this matter, the Department must establish a
process that does not allow the American Bankers/AIG "tag team" to misuse the
Department's procedures.
Consolidation would also take away AIG's information
advantage by giving AIG and Season equal access to information as participants
in each other's Form A proceedings. Admittedly, even with consolidation, AIG
may continue to control American Bankers' participation in the process, but it
would be without its current informational and procedural advantage.
Consolidation will thus insure true Department neutrality and a level playing
field. The Department should not condone AIG's attempts to twist the
Department's policies and procedures for AIG's own advantage over American
Bankers' shareholders and policyholders.
- --------
(6) "On July 10, 1997 . . . possible synergies and expense savings were
discussed with [Howard I. Smith, executive vice-president, CFO and Comptroller
of AIG] who requested more detailed information on American Bankers
operations." Id. "On July 29, 1997, management of American Bankers presented
Mr. Smith with a written analysis regarding possible synergies and expense
savings." Id. "Through out August 1997, American Bankers continued to work on
refining its analysis of possible . . . expense savings." AIG Proxy Statement
at 23.
26
The benefits of consolidation are admitted by AIG. Although
AIG insists to the Department that no comparison between AIG and Season is
necessary in Departmental proceedings ("each application can and must be
assessed on its own merit"), AIG has taken a diametrically opposite position in
its submissions to the Florida federal court. There, AIG states:
State insurance regulators will have to examine Cendant's
insurance experience carefully (and compare it to AIG's)
before approving any merger with American Bankers.
AIG complaint, at P. 25. AIG is simply trying to play both sides of the
argument to its own advantage.
In its complaint, AIG also alleges that the AIG merger "is
much further along than Cendant's efforts to obtain approval for its proposed
acquisition of American Bankers . . . ." AIG complaint at P. P. 25, 29. AIG
knows full well that the Department's confidentiality policy has prevented
Season from knowing the details of AIG's Form A proceedings and is thus unable
to assess the veracity of this statement. AIG's recent agreement to give Season
its Form A is too little, too late. Consolidation would strip AIG of this
unfair advantage, which allows AIG to hide behind a cloak of secrecy while
striking out at Season.
Published reports, however, reveal that AIG's allegation of
Department progress is not accurate. The Takeover Stock Report reported on
February 3, 1997, the day after Season filed its petition to consolidate, that:
27
AIG initially filed its Form A with the Department on
December 31, 1997. As of this posting [February 3, 1998], it
is our understanding that the [AIG] Form A is not complete
and that a "deficiency letter" has been sent to those
parties. (emphasis in original)
(Copy attached hereto as E).
AIG is obviously engaged in a public campaign to damage the
Season tender offer. AIG has alleged many improprieties concerning Season and
its management recklessly and baselessly contending that Season is not fit to
run American Bankers. Presumptuously, AIG concludes that Season should have
disclosed that it "would find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure
regulatory approval" for its proposed acquisition of American Bankers. AIG
complaint at P. 25. AIG has not petitioned to intervene in the Season Form A
proceedings to properly raise such allegations. Instead, it has made
allegations impugning Season's fitness in a letter filed in AIG's own Form A
proceedings, thus attempting to shield the allegations from properly being
tested by cross-examination and contrary evidence at a hearing on Season's
application. As to Season's proceedings, AIG will rely on its puppet, American
Bankers, to appear there, and thus hopes to obtain the best of both worlds: a
delay of Season's Form A proceedings while facilitating its own. The Department
should not allow AIG to play so fast and loose with the rules of fairness. It
should consolidate both proceedings so that each bidder can demonstrate to the
Department
28
any weaknesses in the other's application. The American Bankers' shareholders
and policyholders and the public will benefit from the process.
THIS IS A PENDING PROCEEDING
AIG's assertion that the present activities of the Department
and the parties are not a "proceeding" but rather are only a "free form"
exercise is a distinction without basis in fact or law. It still incumbent
upon the Department to gain access to all relevant information about AIG's
application. Because AIG is attempting to hide or ignore relevant information
(such as the impact of the lock up option), Season should be allowed to
intervene and assist in the fact finding determination. In the pending federal
district court action, AIG has refused to enter into a confidentiality
agreement with Season which would allow full disclosure to the Department of
all discovery obtained in that litigation. AIG's refusal only begs the
question: what is it they trying to hide from this Department, and
subsequently, why should Season be barred from shedding light on the subject?
A "proceeding" is defined as:
An act which is done by authority or direction of the court,
agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to
be done in order to obtain a given end; a prescribed mode of
action for carrying into effect a legal right.
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1983). See also Daniels v. Florida Parole &
Probation Comm'n, 401 So.2d 1351 (1st Dist, DCA, 1981) (defining "proceeding"
29
under the APA as "any proceeding or legal action which is recognized by law").
This broad definition encompasses the Department's Form A application process
and reveals AIG's arguments for what they are -- tautological wordplay.
AIG has attempted to rely on a series of cases which stand
for the proposition that a party may not intervene during the "free-form,
informal process between the time an application is filed and the notice of
proposed agency action is issued." Manasota-88, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental
Regulation, 441 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (emphasis added). See also
Commission on Human Rights v. Bentley, 422 So.2d 964, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
These cases do not provide any support for AIG because the agencies involved in
Manasota and Commission on Human Rights were not poised to render decisions of
possible harm to the proposed interveners. The statute at issue in Manasota did
not even provide for a hearing.
Here, Season has invoked its right to a hearing under Section
628.461(5)(a), Florida Statutes, which defines such hearing as a "proceeding."
This hearing, which is mandated by statute, cannot be fairly characterized as a
"free form" proceeding, which is "nothing more than [a] necessary or convenient
procedure[], unknown to the APA, by which an agency transacts its day-to-day
business." Capeletti Brothers, Inc. v. State Department of Transportation, 362
So.2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), rev. denied, 368 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1979).
Moreover, there is no intermediate step in the Department's review of AIG's
Form A - and thus no point at
30
which the Department will propose agency action for Season to challenge -
before the Department may issue the approval that AIG is hastening to achieve.
AIG's illogical interpretation of the case law would hold Season in waiting
until damaged by a Department decision. Such a result would not only be at odds
with the statutory scheme; it would also be unjust.
In addition, even if the Department is now in the process
"free-form" agency action, Season must be allowed to participate now to prevent
prejudice. As stated in Capeletti Brothers, 362 So.2d at 348:
[an] agency's rules must clearly signal when the
agency's free form decisional process is completed or
at a point when it is appropriate for an affected party to
request formal proceedings . . . . In other words, an
agency must grant affected parties a clear point of
entry, within a specified time after some recognizable
event in investigatory or other free form proceedings
. . . .
Season asserts that the time for entry is now because delay until after
approval of AIG's Form A application will be too late to prevent harm to
Season.
The interrelated nature of the multiple applications
presently before the Department is also telling evidence of their status as
proceedings. Season seeks to intervene in and have a hearing conducted on AIG's
Form A application; AIG has written to the Department urging close scrutiny of
Season's application; American Bankers seeks a hearing on Season's Form A
application; and yet AIG claims that the
31
Department is not yet engaged in a proceeding. All of these requests start
proceedings pursuant to Section 628.461. Indeed, scores of pages have already
been filed on the issues of intervention and consolidation alone. What are
Season, AIG, and American Bankers doing if they are not involved in an ongoing
proceeding?
SEASON'S FILING IS TIMELY
A. SEASON'S PETITION CANNOT BE UNTIMELY AS LONG AS THE DEPARTMENT
MAINTAINS THE POSITION THAT AIG'S FORM A IS CONFIDENTIAL
Season's petition to intervene cannot be deemed untimely
because AIG's Form A application has until only recently remained confidential,
and at present Season still has not been able to review it. The Department's
policy of confidential designation effectively precludes any party from
acquiring the necessary information to seek intervention. In order for a
petition to comply with Model Rule 28-5.201, as it must, the petition is
required to include certain information, such as disputed issues of material
fact, that is unavailable in the absence of access to a Form A. Because Season
desired to make every possible effort to enforce its rights promptly, it
compiled as best it could a short list of some of the issues raised by the
public Form A that AIG filed in Texas. In doing so, Season was forced to assume
that AIG is telling regulators in Florida the same things it is telling the
Texas regulators. Until Season gains access to AIG's Form A (which it is only
now being permitted), however, it cannot verify its assumptions or state with
any certainty that
32
the list of disputed issues is exhaustive. Under these circumstances, its
petition cannot be untimely.
AIG cannot charge Season with constructive notice of filing
simply because Season knew that AIG would eventually file. As stated in Bell
Atlantic Business Systems Services, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Labor and Emp.
Sec., 677 So.2d 989, 992 (1st Dist. DCA 1996):
the contention that [one party's] receipt of notice by any
means informed it of the posting date, and there fore of the
deadline for proving notice of the intent to protest misses
the point.
(emphasis added). See also, Prime Orlando Properties, Inc. v. Dept. of Business
Regulation, 502 So.2d 456 (1st Dist. DCA 1986). The Bell Atlantic court went on
to hold that a statutory point of entry is necessary to set the relevant
deadlines. Here too, AIG "misses the point." Season's assumed knowledge or
beliefs are not enough to put it on notice of a running clock on its right to
intervene.
B. SEASON FILED ITS PETITION WITHIN DAYS OF ACTUAL NOTICE
Season filed its petition to intervene and its petition to
consolidate within 10 days of public notice that AIG had filed Form A
application in Florida as required by Section 628.461(5)(a), Florida Statutes.
As admitted in AIG's opposition papers, AIG's first public announcement that it
had sought agency approval was contained in the January 30, 1998 joint proxy
statement filed by AIG and American
33
Bankers. The joint proxy statement stated that AIG had filed all required
petitions before regulatory agencies. Season filed its petition to intervene
and consolidate on February 2, 1998, only 3 days later. Season has therefore
complied with Section 628.461(5)(a).
C. AIG'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 628.461(5)(A) IS FLAWED
AIG attempts to twist the meaning of notice pursuant to
Section 628.461(5)(a), claiming that the only notice required to start the 10
day period running is that given to "the insurer and controlling company." This
reading renders the statutory right of a person whose substantial interests are
affected by agency Department action a nullity. How could any substantially
affected party ever receive notice if it must only be sent to the insurer to be
acquired? Here, the ramifications are even more sinister because both AIG and
American Bankers have committed themselves to an unlawful merger and therefore
have a vested interest in keeping the details of their proposed transaction
from the rest of the world.
In addition, AIG attempted to prevent notice to Season by
demanding that the Department keep its Form A confidential. Confidential
treatment both prevented Season from discovering when AIG actually filed its
Form A and prevented any review of its contents. Not only was this a manifest
injustice to Season, but it is additional evidence of AIG's manipulation of the
Department's procedures for its own gain.
34
When a regulatory agency fails to give proper notice to warn
parties whose substantial interests are affected, any subsequent agency action
violates due process. See, e.g., Dirt Inc. v. Mobile County Comm'n, 739 F.2d
1562 (11th Cir. 1984) (proper notice reasonably calculated to apprise
interested parties is a jurisdictional prerequisite to valid agency action);
North Alabama Express Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1978)
(reasonable notice to interested persons that their interests may be affected
by administrative action is a requirement of both due process and the
Administrative Procedure Act and will invalidate an agency act until cured).
Due process simply cannot be satisfied by AIG's providing "notice" solely to
American Bankers, its unlawful compatriot, when the interests of so many
others, including Season and American Bankers' shareholders and policyholders,
hang in the balance.
D. THE DEPARTMENT MUST PROVIDE A CLEAR POINT OF ENTRY
As set forth in Season's prior submission, an agency must
provide a substantially affected person with a clear point of entry into agency
proceedings, giving an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Capeletti Brothers,
362 So.2d at 348; Florida League of Cities v. Administration Commission, 586
So.2d 397, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). AIG makes no argument against this
proposition, nor can it. Indeed, even if this proceeding is currently in a
phase of "free-form" review as AIG claims, and it is not, Capeletti Brothers
specifically requires a clear point of entry. As set forth above, Season is
substantially affected by AIG's application, but has not yet received an offer
to participate from the Department or the other parties. Without that clear
point of entry, the Department cannot yet decide AIG's application and Season's
petition to intervene is timely.
35
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated herein, and in Season's original
petition to intervene and consolidate, Season requests that the Department hold
a hearing on AIG's Form A application, order that Season be permitted to
intervene in the AIG Form A Proceedings and consolidate and decide
simultaneously the AIG Form A proceedings and the Season Form A proceedings.
MAIDA, GALLOWAY & NEAL, P.A.
By: /s/ Thomas J. Maida
-----------------------------------
Thomas J. Maida
Florida Bar No. 275212
300 East Park Avenue
P.O. Box 1819
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Of counsel:
Stephen T. Maher
Shutts & Bowen
1500 Miami Center
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131
37
Exhibit C
The Insurance Regulator
July 21, 1997
AIG Becomes New Quackenbush Target
The California Department of Insurance has opened an investigation of AIG's
business practices, prompted in part by the insurer's alleged role in the Golden
Eagle Insurance insolvency proceedings.
Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush has targeted AIG for certain alleged
false statements that are said to be roiling the producer community, and
potentially undermining the rehabilitation of Golden Eagle Insurance Co.
"The department has been alerted to AIG's attempt to disrupt the economic
relations between Golden Eagle and its new owner, Liberty Mutual," the
department charged.
AIG lost to Liberty Mutual a court bid to rehabilitate Golden Eagle May 30.
The New York-based company had earlier been declared the winner in a sealed bid
auction for workers comp Golden Eagle, a bid conducted by Quackenbush himself.
The Department of Insurance had executed a definitive agreement with AIG on
details of the rehabilitation plan but AIG is appealing, charging that the
department failed to defend its bidding process and its own decision during the
court process.
Consumer complaints about the company's insurance practices and conduct,
coupled with the "recent disturbing events in the Golden Eagle rehabilitation"
fueled the push for an investigation and a hearing, according to the department.
Mark Lowder, enforcement chief for the department, said that the business
practices under investigation are primarily those of allegedly spreading false
statements to third parties. The hearings are going to be held because "We want
to get to bottom of it." He shied away from charging AIG with slander.
"There is a big producer communityo1,200 Golden Eagle employees and several
thousand producers that are being caused anxietyand problems," Lowder said. "We
see a viable rehabilitation," he said, and AIG is viewed as undermining that
process.
There is as of yet no hearing date or location set and no word on what if any
sanctions would be taken against AIG under the charges leveled by the
department.
"It depends on what we substantiate. We have to find out what's going on. We
have a lot at stake here," Lowder said.
The hearing will also review "rising public concern over AIG's insurance
practices in California," although it remained unclear what, if anything, beyond
the Golden Eagle matter this concern entailed.
The department has pointed to policyholder complaints: "We have received
numerous complaints from consumers about AIG's conduct, stated Joel Laucher,
division chief of consumer services for the department.
The recent legal filings made by AIG appealing the award of Golden Eagle to
Liberty Mutual would not be counted as business practices, Lowder said.
AIG filed a petition for writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal in
San Francisco in its ongoing efforts to overturn the May 30 trial court decision
in the rehabilitation of Golden Eagle, it announced July 7. The company also
requested that the trial court hearing on the Liberty Mutual contract be
postponed until Golden Eagle's policyholders are "told all of the terms of the
transaction." This includes, alleges AIG, Quackenbush's "partially secret deal
with John Mabee," Golden Eagle's former owner. Mabee's company fell to state
regulators in late January in a financial takeover after a public relations,
media and actuarial/accounting war that lasted almost half a year.
Act II of the Golden Eagle media war could very well be starting.
The California department went on to complain in a second press release last
week that the "massive East Coast-based company" had retained a paid legislative
lobbying force as well as enlisted trial lawyers in its "derailing" efforts. AIG
was also able to convince a state senator to take a bill, S.B. 1042 and insert
proposed amendments that it hopes will scuttle the Golden Eagle plan.
"If passed, this bill would mean policyholders would fall victim to failed
insurers," said Dana Spurrier, a department spokesperson. "Policyholders would
be delayed payment of their insurance claims as much as 10 years in future
conservation proceedings," she explained.
The department also recounted the results of the department's tug of war with
Mabee and a page on why the court awarded the winning bid for Golden Eagle's
rehabilitation to Liberty Mutual. AIG's proposal was muddled and the company
demanded a guarantee that it would receive at least $1.2 billion in assessments,
the department contends. It would offer no guarantees of its own and did not
show as great a commitment to keeping Golden Eagle jobs as well as an
independent San Diego operation, according to the department.
AIG characterized the California department's actions as retaliation against
the Golden Eagle challenge. The Department of Insurance announced its
investigation the day after AIG had filed its objections to the Golden Eagle
plan and shortly after AIG had filed an appeal critical of Quackenbush's actions
on Golden Eagle. The New York company stated that it would continue to pursue
its challenge to the Golden Eagle rehabilitation proceedings, despite the
launching of an investigation by the department.
"The commissioner has lost twice in the judicial branch and is under scrutiny
in the legislative branch," stated Florence A. Davis, AIG vice president and
general council. On July 8, the California Assembly Insurance Committee heard
testimony critical of the department's handling of the Golden Eagle
rehabilitation, Davis had noted. And in June the department lost two attempts to
remove AIG7 7 from intervening in the case, she stated.
Exhibit D
The Wall Street Journal
Monday, February 9, 1998
AIG Assails Cendant's Reputation In Battle for American Bankers
By Leslie Scism and Emily Nelson
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal
American International Group Inc., returning fire against Cendant Corp.
in a rare takeover battle in the insurance industry, attacked the reputation of
its rival in a federal lawsuit and a national newspaper advertisement.
The offensive sets the stage for a long and unusual fight over American
Bankers Insurance Group Inc., a profitable direct marketer of credit-related
insurance. Unlike most bidding contests in other industries, AIG's move
attempts to shift the battlefield, at least for now, away from price to the
state regulatory process that governs the sale of any insurance company.
Under state insurance laws, regulators are required to put the
interests of policyholders ahead of those of shareholders in approving
ownership changes. Toward that end, AIG's counterattack minimized references to
the 23% gap that separates its $47-a-share, or $2.2 billion, cash-and-stock bid
from Cendant's $58-a-share, or $2.7 billion, cash-and-stock tender offer.
Instead, in its civil lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Miami,
AIG, one of the world's financially strongest and most profitable insurers,
accuses Cendant, a marketing juggernaut whose brand names include Avis rental
cars, Ramada hotels and Century 21 real-estate brokerages, of a "campaign of
misinformation" about Cendant's financial strength and ability to operate
companies. The misinformation, AIG maintains, masks the "difficult, if not
impossible," task Cendant faces in winning prompt regulatory approvals. AIG
contends that the false statements violate federal securities law regarding
solicitation of shareholder votes.
Cendant, which has sued AIG in the same court also alleging
misrepresentations in connection with American Bankers, responded in a lengthy
press release that AIG's lawsuit is baseless and that the advertisement is full
of "canards" to distract investors from the price differential. Cendant also
disputed that it is handicapped in the regulatory process.
While many Wall Street analysts believe that AIG ultimately will have
to raise its bid, its campaign to discredit Cendant clearly complicates its
rival's effort. Indeed, AIG's lawsuit personally attacks Cendant's president
and chief executive officer, Henry R. Silverman, whose acquisition-built HFS
Inc. merged with CUC International Inc. to form Cendant this past December. The
attacks primarily relate to Mr. Silverman's involvement with leveraged buyouts
in the 1980s.
AIG's lawsuit and full-page advertisement, which ran Friday in The Wall
Street Journal and is scheduled to run this week in Miami newspapers, maintain
that Cendant, of Stamford, Conn., and Parsippany, N.J., has a highly leveraged
balance sheet, few tangible assets and no experience running insurance
companies. Yet, the lawsuit states, Cendant falsely claims that it is on "equal
footing" with the New York financial-services giant in the process to gain
regulatory approval to acquire Miami- based American Bankers. The suit seeks a
court order barring Cendant from such statements, among other things.
Cendant's Mr. Silverman said in an interview Friday that he "wouldn't
even dignify" the personal elements of the lawsuit with a response. Calling the
lawsuit and advertisement "a smoke screen," he said, "It's clear that AIG wants
to intimidate, or browbeat, everyone into thinking their offer is superior,
even though it's $11 less than ours." He added, "If [AIG Chairman Maurice R.]
Greenberg wants the company, he's going to have to pay up."
Mr. Greenberg, however, said in an interview Saturday that talk of bumping
up his offer, which he considers fair, is premature until the regulatory issues
are resolved. "We'll fight one battle at a time," he said, adding: "We'll do
whatever we have to do to make sure the issues are clear" to regulators.
For its part, American Bankers said in a news release that its
directors would make "no recommendation at this time" about Cendant's offer
because the board "has been unable to assess several aspects of the offer."
These include Cendant's "relatively high level of leverage," business plans and
ability to provide capital to help American Bankers expand.
The directors are stymied by a provision in American Bankers' pact with
AIG barring it from talking to other suitors at this point. But in a move that
indicates the key role regulators will play, American Bankers said that on
Friday it asked the Florida Insurance Department, its lead regulator, to
schedule a public hearing to review Cendant's proposal. There, regulators could
seek the information that American Bankers can't ask Cendant directly-a hearing
at which AIG would be expected to present its case against Cendant.
Insurance regulators said it is too early to discuss what role they
will play in resolving the matter. The Florida regulators recently notified AIG
that more information was needed on its Dec. 31 application to acquire American
Bankers, while Cendant's application was received just last week.
At issue in Florida and a handful of other states where American Bankers
has subsidiaries are laws that allow insurance commissioners to reject
ownership changes in cases in which the financial condition or competence of
the acquiring party might harm policyholders.
"This thing is going to be looked at like no other deal has been looked
at before by insurance regulators," said Kenneth Zuckerberg, an insurance
analyst with Moody's Investors Service. "There exists a very strong case that
American Bankers would be a stronger and more focused company under AIG
ownership than under Cendant's, and AIG will certainly leverage its position as
an insurance organization rated triple-A," the highest possible, to encourage
regulators to see it its way.
Wall Street analysts generally agree with AIG that Cendant's balance
sheet is laden with so-called goodwill from acquisitions that delivered it
brand names rather than tangible assets. But Chris Feiss, an analyst with BT
Alex. Brown Inc., disputed that Cendant is "highly" leveraged, noting that its
20% debt-to-total-capitalization ratio exists amid ample cash flow. Cendant
notes that its debt carries single-A investment-grade ratings.
Exhibit E
TAKEOVER
STOCK REPORT
February 3, 1998
American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. (ABI)/Cendant (CD)
American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. (ABI)/American International Group, k
Inc. (AIG)
2/3/98, 3:25 p.m. - In light of CD's recent motions with the Florida
Department of Insurance, we want to point out some language from the Florida
DOI regulations. The most relevant section -- section 628.461(5)(a)--provides
as follows:
"The acquisition of voting securities shall be deemed approved unless the
department disapproves the proposed acquisition within 90 days after the
statement required by subsection (1) has been filed. The department may on its
own initiate, or if requested to do so in writing by a substantially affected
party shall conduct, a proceeding to consider the appropriateness of the
proposed filing. The 90-day time period shall be tolled during the pendency of
the proceeding. Any written request for a proceeding must be filed with the
department within 10 days of the date of notice of the filing is given. During
the pendency of the proceeding or review period by the department, any person
or affiliated person complying with the filing requirements of this section
may proceed and take all steps necessary to conclude the acquisition so long
as the acquisition becoming final is conditioned upon obtaining departmental
approval..."
We want to discuss this in three parts -- first the law, second the facts as
we understand them, and third some conclusions and opinions.
First, as a general rule, the regulation is worded such that a Form A
application [the acquisition of voting securities] shall be approved unless...
(If the DOI chooses to disapprove a Form A it must do so within 90 days of the
date the Form A is "filed").
Although the regulation does not state this explicitly, the DOI tells us that
an application is deemed "filed" when it is deemed "complete," not necessarily
on the date of initial filing. Thus, if the DOI chooses to disapprove a Form
A, it must do so within 90 days of the date the Form A is deemed "complete".
Typically, according to the DOI, a Form A is reviewed within 30 days of its
filing to determine whether it is complete. If it is not complete, a
"deficiency letter" is sent out. If it is complete, the parties submitting the
Form A are notified of that, and the application is then put on "notice" as
referred to in the regulation.
The regulation makes clear that hearings are discretionary rather than
mandatory, unless a "substantially affected party" requests in writing that a
"proceeding" be held to consider the filing. If such a party makes such a
request in writing, and in time, then a "proceeding" is mandatory ("shall").
While the "proceeding" takes place, the 90-day clock is not running against
the DOI. Once the "proceeding" is completed, the 90-day clock (minus any
non-"proceeding" days which have already passed) begins to run again.
A "substantially affected party" must make its request in writing within 10
days of the date of "notice" of the filing. (This 10-day deadline does not
begin running until the filing is put on "notice," and a filing is not put on
"notice" until it is deemed "complete".)
The following is our understanding of the facts at this time:
AIG initially filed its Form A with the Department on December 31, 1997. As of
this posting, it's our understanding that the Form A is not complete and that
a "deficiency letter" has been sent to those parties. We do not know the date
of the deficiency letter.
CD initially filed its Form A on January 27, 1998. As of this posting, it is
our understanding that the Form A is also not complete. However, no deficiency
letter has been sent out yet; the CD Form A thus appears to be in the initial
review period to determine its completeness.
2
No hearings have yet been scheduled on either Form A.
CD notes in its 14D-1 today that it filed motions with the DOI yesterday
(February 2, 1998) seeking (a) to have the two Form A reviews consolidated
into one review, with a simultaneous decision from the DOI on the two
applications, (b) to intervene in the AIG Form A proceeding, and (c) to
request, presumably as a "substantially affected party," a hearing on the AIG
Form A application.
Our conclusions and opinions are as follows:
First, CD will be found to be a "substantially affected party." According to a
staff lawyer at the DOI, that phrase (in other contexts) has been interpreted
very broadly to include virtually anybody who cares about the transaction.
Second, since the AIG Form A is apparently not yet complete and on notice, CD
has timely (with 10 days) filed its request for a hearing. Therefore, the DOI
must schedule a hearing (a "proceeding" to be exact) on the ABI/AIG Form A.
Third, since neither Form A has yet been deemed complete, the 90-day clock has
not yet begun to run against the DOI on either application.
Fourth, Form A applications in Florida routinely generate a "deficiency
letter", and its is distinctly possible that CD will receive such a letter in
the near future.
Fifth, this appears to be an unprecedented situation for the Florida DOI. At
this time, we are unaware of a similar set of circumstances. The staff
attorney we spoke to, for example, did not know if there are procedures
available to CD to seek the "consolidated" review of Form A applications or
the "simultaneous" decision on the applications.
With all of this is mind, it seems too early to predict how these
circumstances will play out at the DOI.
2/3/98, 3:25 P.M.- In light of CD's recent motions with the Florida Department
of Insurance, we want to point out some language from the Florida DOI
regulations. The most
3
relevant section -- section 628.461(5)(a) -- provides as follows:
"The acquisition of voting securities shall be deemed approved unless the
department disapproves the proposed acquisition within 90 days after the
statement required by subsection (1) has been filed. The department may on its
own initiate, or if requested to do so in writing by a substantially affected
party shall conduct, a proceeding to consider the appropriateness of the
proposed filing. The 90-day time period shall be tolled during the pendency of
the proceeding. Any written request for a proceeding must be filed with the
department within 10 days of the date of notice of the filing is given. During
the pendency of the proceeding or review period by the department, any person
or affiliated person complying with the filing requirements of this section
may proceed and take all steps necessary to conclude the acquisition so long
as the acquisition becoming final is conditioned upon obtaining conclude the
acquisition so long as the acquisition becoming final is conditioned upon
obtaining department approval..."
We want to discuss this in three parts -- first the law, second the facts as
we understand them, and third some conclusions and opinions.
First, as a general rule, the regulation is worded such that a Form A
application [the acquisition of voting securities] shall be approved unless...
(If the DOI chooses to disapprove a Form A, it must do so within 90 days of
the date the Form A is "filed.")
Although, the regulation does not state this explicitly, the DOI tells us that
an application is deemed "filed" when it is deemed "complete" not necessarily
on the date of initial filing. Thus, if the DOI chooses to disapprove a Form
A, it must do so within 90 days of the date the Form A is deemed "complete".
Typically, according to the DOI, a Form A is reviewed within 30 days of its
filing to determine whether it is complete. If it is not complete, a
"deficiency letter" is sent out. If it is complete, the parties submitting the
Form A are notified of that, and the application is then put on "notice" as
referred to in the regulation.
4
The regulation makes clear that hearings are discretionary rather than
mandatory, unless a "substantially affected party" requests in writing that a
"proceeding" be held to consider the filing. If such a party makes such a
request in writing, and in time, then a "proceeding" is mandatory ("shall").
While the "proceeding" takes place, the 90-day clock is not running against
the DOI. Once the "proceeding" is completed, the 90-day clock (minus any
non-"proceeding" days which have already passed) begins to run again.
A "substantially affected party" must make its request in writing within 10
days of the date of "notice" of the filing. (This 10-day deadline does not
begin running until the filing is put on "notice," and a filing is not put on
"notice" until it is deemed "complete").
The following is our understanding of the facts at this time:
AIG initially filed its Form A with the Department on December 31, 1997. As of
this posting, it's our understanding that the Form A is not complete and that
a "deficiency letter" has been sent to those parties. We do not know the date
of the deficiency letter.
CD initially filed its Form A on January 27, 1998. As of this posting, it is
our understanding that the Form A is also not complete. However, no deficiency
letter has been sent out yet; the CD Form A thus appears to be in the initial
review period to determine its completeness.
No hearing have yet been scheduled on either Form A.
CD notes in its 14D-1 today that it filed motions with the DOI yesterday
(February 2, 1998) seeking (a) to have the two Form A reviews consolidated
into one review, with a simultaneous decision from the DOI on the two
applications, (b) to intervene in the AIG Form A proceeding, and (c) to
request presumably as a "substantially affected party," a hearing on the AIG
Form A application.
Our conclusions and opinions are as follows:
First, CD will be found to be a "substantially affected party." According to a
staff lawyer at the DOI, that
5
phrase (in other contexts) has been interpreted very broadly to include
virtually anybody who cares about the transaction.
Second, since the AIG Form A is apparently not yet complete and on notice, CD
has timely (with 10-days) filed its request for a hearing. Therefore, the DOI
must schedule a hearing (a "proceeding" to be exact) on the ABI/AIG Form A.
Third, since neither Form A has yet been deemed complete, the 90-day clock has
not yet begun to run against the DOI on either application.
Fourth, Form A applications in Florida routinely generate a "deficiency
letter," and its distinctly possible that CD will receive such a letter in the
near future.
Fifth, this appears to be an unprecedented situation for the Florida DOI. At
this time, we are unaware of a similar set of circumstances. The staff
attorney we spoke to, for example, did not know if there are procedures
available to CD to seek the "consolidated" review of Form A applications of
the "simultaneous" decision on the applications.
With all of this in mind, it seems too early to predict how these
circumstances will play out at the DOI.
COAST SAVINGS FINANCIAL INC. (CSA)/H.F. ABMANSON & CO. (AHM)
2/3/98, 2:25 A.M. -- As of this posting, the companies are still waiting for
the approval of the Office of Thrift Supervision. The OTS approval is the only
outstanding regulatory approval. Next Thursday, February 12, 1998, is the CSA
shareholder meeting to vote on the transaction. The companies remain
optimistic that he OTS approval will be received in time to allow for a
"mid-February" closing. (They plan to close the deal promptly after the final
hurdles is cleared, whether that final hurdle is the shareholder vote or the
OTS approval.) As we have noted in some past reports, there is not deadline
for action by the OTS. However, we do expect the OTS to approve the
application, as the companies predict, by mid-February, 1998.
6
BGS SYSTEMS (BGSS)/BMC SOFTWARE, INC. (BMCS)
2/3/98, 1:40 P.M. - BGSS, in its 10-K does cite BMCS as one of its
competitors. BGSS also cites Computer Associate, Digital Equipment, Compware,
Candle, Hewlette-Packard, Landmark Systems, and IBM. Also in their web-based
Acquisition Q&A, the companies state that "The products are very
complementary. Some technology pieces overlap -- primarily collectors and
agents. We will work together to develop an integration plan which utilizes
the best technologies from both companies." Interestingly, that same Q&A
session also notes that, BEST/1 [the BGSS core product] does not have direct
competition across all the functionality it provides. BGS is recognized as a
leader and unique in their performance modeling capabilities. Other companies
that compete in the performance monitoring and analysis market are Candle,
Boole & Babbage and Landmark." Finally, as PC Week notes, "The two vendors
have a lot in common. For example, they share a history as mainframe
management software providers who moved into the client serve space. They also
have very similar direct sales distribution models."
There is clearly some marginal overlap in the companies' product lines, but we
still expect no significant antitrust scrutiny. Although the language used to
describe these products is somewhat confusing, all industry people seem to
agree that this is an effort to integrate the BGSS niche into the
broader-based BMCS mainframe management software portfolio. Other than the
generic reference to BMCS as a competitor in the BGSS 10-K, we have not seen
any indications that their products directly compete in a meaningful way. We
remain comfortable with the project time line for completion in the normal 60
to 90 days.
SAFETY-KLEEN CORP.(SK)/LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.(LLE)
2/3/98, 12:30 P.M. - According to the Judge's office in U.S. District Court in
Illinois, the hearing in this matter will continue at 2:00 p.m. CST today. It
is expected to be completed today or tomorrow. The Judge is expect to issue a
ruling tomorrow.
7
FIRSTBANK OF ILLINOIS CO.(FBIC)/MERCANTILE BANCORPORATION (MTL)
2/3/98, 12:00 NOON - According to MTL, it will need to divest all of FBIC's
Missouri deposits in order
8
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
In re: Application for Approval of the Acquisition
of a Controlling Interest (Form D14-918) filed by
CENDANT CORPORATION and SEASON ACQUISITION
CORP. Relating to American Bankers Insurance Company of
Florida, American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida
and Voyager Service Warranties, Inc., Domestic Insurers
- ------------------------------------------------------- /
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF
SEASON'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
Cendant Corporation and Season Acquisition Corp., its
wholly-owned subsidiary (collectively, "Season"), hereby submit this reply
memorandum in further support of their application to the Department of
Insurance (the "Department") for an order consolidating this proceeding with
the administrative proceeding instituted by American International Group, Inc.
("AIG") and AIGF, Inc. ("AIGF"), a Florida corporation wholly-owned by AIG, by
the filing of form DI4-918 (the "AIG Form A Application") with the Department.
Season has submitted a similar request in AIG's Form A proceedings, which
request also seeks leave for Season to intervene in those proceedings by AIG
relating to the acquisition of control of the same domestic insurers.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Department now faces for the first time competing
applications for approval to acquire a domestic insurer. Neither Season nor AIG
should receive any advantage as a result of the timing of the Department's
action. Florida law requires the Department to follow an even-handed and level
process that will be fair to American Bankers' shareholders and policyholders,
to the public, and to Season and AIG as well. This process will also allow the
Department to give thorough consideration to the applications - free from
concern that it will disadvantage the applicants or American Bankers'
shareholders or policyholders.
Fortunately, there is clear Florida statutory, regulatory and
case law authority to guide the Department and the interested parties through
the approval proceedings. A review of this authority demonstrates that the
Department should consolidate Season's own application with the AIG
proceedings, in order to allow all parties whose substantial interests will be
affected by the Department's actions to participate in and aid this
consideration. Neither side should be permitted to manipulate the Department's
review process for advantage. Season does not seek to do so and AIG's effort to
do so - in order to overcome the substantially inferior economics of its
proposal - should be rejected.
A lawsuit filed by Season currently pending in federal
district court in Florida alleges, among other things, that the AIG/American
Bankers merger
2
agreement is violative of Florida law because in pursuing the merger with AIG
American Bankers' directors, aided and abetted by AIG, abandoned their duties
to American Bankers' shareholders by accepting AIG's inadequate offer while at
the same time agreeing to a number of provisions designed to frustrate the
attempt of any competing bidder to acquire American Bankers at a higher price.
Moreover, AIG's Form A application raises a number of serious issues that will
require close scrutiny by the Department before it acts on AIG's application.
For example:
AIG has not been forthright by failing to disclose that it is
controlled by its chairman, Maurice Greenberg, through a
number of off-shore companies;
AIG has maintained a close association with several former
senior officials of the bankrupt Drexel Burnham Lambert to
speculate in high risk junk bonds and other exotic financial
products;
Greenberg has caused AIG to engage in highly unusual
and unseemly transactions to benefit one of his
relatives; and
AIG has frequently come under fire for its business
practices, which have been described by one regulator as
"repulsive."
These issues, which are more fully described in Season's opening brief in
support of its motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by AIG, will be aired before
the federal district court in Florida at a hearing on that motion. (A copy of
Season's opening brief is attached hereto as Exhibit A). The illegality of the
merger agreement and the issues
3
raised by AIG's Form A application warrant a hearing by the Department on AIG's
Form A.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
AIG's efforts to preclude consolidation are part of a
desperate campaign to prevent the Department from evaluating the true facts
surrounding AIG's attempted acquisition, to manipulate the regulatory review
process to further AIG's efforts to obtain American Bankers on the cheap and to
thwart Season's superior competing offer. The public interes plainly warrants a
level regulatory playing field in which neither side is able to extract any
advantage based simply on the procedures used by the department. AIG is unable
to demonstrate any prejudice if the proceedings are consolidated. Moreover, it
cannot minimize the obvious benefits to the public which will flow from
Season's active participation.
Despite AIG's unsupported arguments to the contrary,
consolidation is mandated by statute in this instance. As part of its campaign
to acquire American Bankers, AIG is seeking to manipulate the Department's
procedures to delay approval of Season's Form A. Consolidation will eliminate
this inequity and will thus result in equality in the marketplace and fairness
to the public.
4
CONSOLIDATION SHOULD BE ORDERED
A. THE DEPARTMENT HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE THE AIG
AND SEASON FORM A PROCEEDINGS
Significantly, AIG does not claim that it would be prejudiced
by consolidation. Instead, it argues that the Department has no power to
consolidate these proceedings. AIG's assertion that "there is no statutory,
rule or case authority for consolidation" of the AIG Form A proceedings with
Season's Form A proceedings is incorrect, and AIG's attempt to convince the
Department to adopt a rule requiring common issues of law and fact before
consolidating proceedings is simply wrong. Florida's Administrative Procedure
Act does in fact provide for the Department to consolidate these proceedings.
Section 120.54(10), Florida Statutes (1995), states that
the appropriate model rules shall be the rules of procedure
for each agency subject to this act to the extent that each
agency does not adopt a specific rule of procedure covering
the subject matter . . .1 (emphasis added)
- --------
1 In 1996, this section was superseded by Section 120.54(5), Florida
Statutes (1997), which authorized the creation of Uniform Rules of Procedure to
replace the Model Rules. Agencies have until July 1, 1998 to comply with the
Uniform Rules. The list of those agencies now complying with the Uniform Rules
published by the Secretary of State in the Florida Administrative Weekly does
not presently include the Department. If, however, the Department has begun to
follow the Uniform Rules the result here is the same, as Uniform Rule
28-106.108 is substantially identical to Model Rule 28-5.106.
5
Because the Department does not have its own rule on consolidation, Season's
request is governed by Model Rule 28-5.106, which states that the Department
may consolidate matters "which involve similar issues of law or fact" if it
appears that consolidation would promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of the proceedings and would not unduly prejudice the rights of a
party. (emphasis added) Thus the rule does not require, as AIG has suggested,
that the agency must determine that there are common issues of both law and
fact before consolidating proceedings. Instead, the Department must only find
similar legal or factual issues and that consolidation would promote justice,
efficiency and reduction of expense.
The AIG and Season Form A applications raise numerous similar
factual and legal issues. By way of example, and without limitation, under
Section 628.461(7) the Department must consider in reviewing both the AIG and
Season Form A applications:
(1) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on
American Bankers' corporate structure and
financial strength;
(2) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on
American Bankers' policyholders and the public;
(3) the impact of the proposed acquisitions on the
Florida insurance market; and
(4) the impact of any proposed changes to the management
and control of American Bankers.
6
It would be inappropriate and an inefficient use of the Department's resources
to perform each of these analyses twice, in separate proceedings, particularly
since consideration of one application before the other would have the effect
of favoring one applicant over another.
B. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOT BE AN ACCESSORY TO INJUSTICE
AIG and American Bankers are manipulating this Department's
procedures to gain advantage in the marketplace. In response to Season's
request to level the playing field through consolidation, AIG coyly states that
"the field's unevenness was neither the Department's doing nor AIG's doing" and
offers the non sequitur that therefore "neutrality is required not only by
Florida Administrative law but also by federal law."
AIG's true goal here is anything but neutrality. AIG has
filed a document with the insurance departments of all six of American Bankers'
domiciliary states recklessly impugning Season's financial status, competence
to operate an insurer and the integrity of Cendant's President and Chief
Executive Officer, Henry R. Silverman.2 Significantly, AIG has filed this
document in its own application
- --------
2 This is not the first time AIG has resorted to scurrilous attacks as
a weapon in an acquisition context. Recently, in July 1997, the California
Department of Insurance investigated AIG for making false statements intended
to undermine the rehabilitation of Golden Eagle Insurance Co. after its bid to
acquire that company was rejected by a court. The investigation also extended
to AIG's business practices in California, which had been the subject of
numerous complaints from consumers. See Elizabeth Festa, AIG Becomes New
Quackenbush Target, Insurance Accountant, July 21, 1997 (copy attached as
Exhibit B).
7
proceedings (proceedings from which it is fighting to exclude Season) rather
than Season's, where its allegations are more properly raised but would be
subject to cross-examination and refutation by Season.
AIG also attempts to misuse both the Department's
confidentiality policy and neutral hearing procedure to seize an improper
advantage over Season. The Department's policy is to treat each Form A filing
on a "confidential" basis. This policy of confidentiality has, however, been
vitiated by AIG and American Bankers because American Bankers has, in the
merger agreement, contracted to provide AIG with copies of Season's Form A.
Although AIG has now agreed to exchange Form A applications with Season, this
recent development does not obviate the prejudice already inflicted upon Season
through AIG's early access to Season's Form A.
AIG and American Bankers have further agreed to use Section
628.461's "neutral" hearing procedures to secure unfair advantage for AIG. The
statute, which allows a target company to invoke a proceeding to stop the
ninety day clock for approving a Form A, contemplates the exercise of that
power by a target company that is acting independently with regard to the
proposed takeover. Although the right to such a proceeding is rarely exercised
by an insurer, American Bankers, by contracting in the merger agreement to use
its "best efforts" to ensure the
8
success of its merger with AIG, has effectively bound itself to do all it can
to derail Season's bid, including by invoking its purported right to a hearing
on Season's Form A. Merger Agreement at P. 6.5(b).3
Significantly, American Bankers has also agreed that it and
AIG shall have the right to review in advance, and to the
extent practicable each will consult the other on, all the
information relating to [AIG] or the [American Bankers] . . .
that appear in any filing made with, or written materials
submitted to, any third party and/or any Governmental Entity
in connection with the Merger or the other transactions
contemplated by this Agreement." (emphasis added)
Merger Agreement at P. 6.5. This language not only gives AIG a contractual
right to obtain Season's Form A from American Bankers, but it also effectively
allowed AIG to participate in (or, as seems more likely, to demand) the
decision by American Bankers to request a hearing on Season's Form A.
This suspect agreement is not the first indication that AIG
is acting in concert with American Bankers to frustrate those who would make a
higher bid for American Bankers. As set out more fully in Season's complaint
filed in federal court
- --------
3 American Bankers has reportedly requested a hearing in this Form A
application. Leslie Scism and Emily Nelson, AIG Assails Cendant's Reputation In
Battle for American Bankers, The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1998, at p.
B5 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit C). This provides a further reason for the
Department to consolidate the proceedings and hold one hearing. As discussed
further below, AIG has a contractual agreement with American Bankers that
permits it to control American Bankers' conduct in this hearing. It is only
fair for the Department to consider AIG's Form A in the same hearing, and to
allow Season the same opportunity as AIG has to comment on its competitor's
application.
9
against AIG and American Bankers and attached to Season's original petition,
the merger agreement also contains an impressive, and improper, array of
measures designed to frustrate more attractive bids for American Bankers,
including, among many others, the 19.9% lock-up option.
The results of American Bankers' contractual obligations are
demonstrable here. By demanding a hearing in connection with Season's Form A
and (presumably) failing to demand a similar hearing in connection with AIG's
Form A, American Bankers is clearly assisting AIG in its attempt to gain a
market advantage over Season by seeking to delay approval of Season's Form A.
Further, American Bankers has agreed to consult with AIG on any action American
Bankers takes with respect to Season's Form A. Simply put, American Bankers has
contracted to be AIG's puppet in AIG's attempt to defeat Season's superior bid.
In light of its contractual arrangement with American
Bankers, AIG's feigned outrage at what it claims to be Season's failure to
respect the required "neutrality" in administrative proceedings is transparent.
AIG and American Bankers have distorted this principle in order to advance
their own ends and to bring harm to Season. Justice requires that their
manipulation be brought to a halt, which can only be accomplished through
consolidation and simultaneous hearing.
10
C. COMPETING APPLICATIONS WARRANT CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation and joint decision where two entities are
competing for one mutually exclusive goal is required by Ashbacker Radio v.
Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), and its progeny. AIG
mistakenly argues that Ashbacker does not apply because the Season and AIG
applications are not mutually exclusive (i.e., the department can authorize one
or many more applications by one or many purchasers to acquire American
Bankers). This simplistic argument blindly misses the point of Ashbacker and
ignores the circumstances here. Because AIG has transformed departmental
approval into the sine qua non of the race to acquire American Bankers the
approval of either acquirer may well be a de facto mutually exclusive decision
by the Department. There is only one American Bankers, and whoever seizes the
advantage in the marketplace will likely succeed in acquiring it. Season asks
only that the Department not allow AIG to obtain unfair advantage in the
marketplace, so that any advantage to Season or AIG will be based solely on the
merits of their offers. No substitute is available to a party left behind in
the regulatory process. Thus, as AIG concedes, the teaching of Ashbacker and it
progeny is
that where two bona fide applications for administrative
approval are mutually exclusive, the grant of one without a
hearing to both, deprives the loser of the hearing to which
he is entitled.
HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, 599 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1992).
11
D. CONSOLIDATION WILL PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH ESSENTIAL
INFORMATION
Consolidation of the AIG and Season proceedings is necessary
to provide both the Department and the public with all essential information on
the Form A applications. As matters stand now, AIG has the contractual right to
restrict American Bankers' freedom independently to assist regulators in
reviewing AIG's filings, assess regulatory requests for information, and
provide information to regulators. Currently, American Bankers will not contest
information in AIG's filings, nor will it to volunteer information to
regulators that might be damaging to AIG, all because it has agreed to use its
"best efforts" to promote and consummate its proposed merger with AIG.
For example, AIG states in its Texas Form A, under the
heading "Future Plans for the Insurer" that "AIG presently intends that the
insurer continue its business in the manner currently conducted and with its
present management . . . ." Season assumes that a similar representation is
made in the AIG's Florida Form A filing. However, as American Bankers well
knows, the achievement of future "expense savings" at American Bankers was a
key factor in AIG's decision to agree to the AIG/American Bankers merger. AIG
reveals in its proxy statement, released on January 30, 1998, that
"[i]n June of 1997, Mr. Greenberg [AIG's Chairman and CEO]
expressed skepticism concerning a possible . . . business
combination with American Bankers because AIG . . . would
realize an insufficient rate of return on its investment . .
. . Soon thereafter, however, Mr. Greenberg requested . . . a
study [of] possible synergies and expense savings. . . .
12
AIG Proxy Statement at 22.
The proxy statement discusses the search for expense savings at some length.4
American Bankers will not contest AIG's Form A on the truth or falsity of AIG's
stated plans for operating American Bankers. On the other hand, Season can
easily assist the Department in probing this point through consolidated
hearings. Thus, to fairly assess this matter, the Department must establish a
process that does not allow the American Bankers/AIG "tag team" to misuse the
Department's procedures.
Consolidation would also take away AIG's information
advantage by giving AIG and Season equal access to information as participants
in each other's Form A proceedings. Admittedly, even with consolidation, AIG
may continue to control American Bankers' participation in the process, but it
would be without its current informational and procedural advantage.
Consolidation will thus insure true Department neutrality and a level playing
field. The Department should not condone
- --------
4 "On July 10, 1997 . . . possible synergies and expense savings were
discussed with [Howard I. Smith, executive vice-president, CFO and Comptroller
of AIG] who requested more detailed information on American Bankers
operations." Id. "On July 29, 1997, management of American Bankers presented
Mr. Smith with a written analysis regarding possible synergies and expense
savings." Id. "Throughout August 1997, American Bankers continued to work on
refining its analysis of possible . . . expense savings." AIG Proxy Statement
at 23.
13
AIG's attempts to twist the Department's policies and procedures for AIG's own
advantage over American Bankers' shareholders and policyholders.
The benefits of consolidation are admitted by AIG. Although
AIG insists to the Department that no comparison between AIG and Season is
necessary in Departmental proceedings ("each application can and must be
assessed on its own merit"), AIG has taken a diametrically opposite position in
its submissions to the Florida federal court. There, AIG states:
State insurance regulators will have to examine Cendant's
insurance experience carefully (and compare it to AIG's)
before approving any merger with American Bankers.
AIG complaint, at P. 25 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit D). AIG is simply
trying to play both sides of the argument to its own advantage.
In its complaint, AIG also alleges that the AIG merger "is
much further along than Cendant's efforts to obtain approval for its proposed
acquisition of American Bankers . . . ." AIG complaint at P. P. 25, 29. AIG
knows full well that the Department's confidentiality policy has prevented
Season from knowing the details of AIG's Form A proceedings and is thus unable
to assess the veracity of this statement. AIG's recent agreement to give Season
its Form A is too little, too late. Consolidation would strip AIG of this
unfair advantage, which allows AIG to hide behind a cloak of secrecy while
striking out at Season.
14
Published reports, however, reveal that AIG's allegation of
Department progress is not accurate. The Takeover Stock Report reported on
February 3, 1997, the day after Season filed its petition to consolidate, that:
AIG initially filed its Form A with the Department on
December 31, 1997. As of this posting [February 3, 1998], it
is our understanding that the [AIG] Form A is not complete
and that a "deficiency letter" has been sent to those
parties. (emphasis in original)
(Copy attached hereto as Exhibit E).
AIG is obviously engaged in a public campaign to damage the
Season tender offer. AIG has alleged many improprieties concerning Season and
its management recklessly and baselessly contending that Season is not fit to
run American Bankers. Presumptuously, AIG concludes that Season should have
disclosed that it "would find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure
regulatory approval" for its proposed acquisition of American Bankers. AIG
complaint at P. 25. AIG has not petitioned to intervene in the Season Form A
proceedings to properly raise such allegations. Instead, it has made
allegations impugning Season's fitness in a letter filed in AIG's own Form A
proceedings, thus attempting to shield the allegations from properly being
tested by cross-examination and contrary evidence at a hearing on Season's
application. As to Season's proceedings, AIG will rely on its puppet, American
Bankers, to appear there, and thus hopes to obtain the best of both worlds: a
delay of Season's Form A proceedings while facilitating its own. The
15
Department should not allow AIG to play so fast and loose with the rules of
fairness. It should consolidate both proceedings so that each bidder can
demonstrate to the Department any weaknesses in the other's application. The
American Bankers' shareholders and policyholders and the public will benefit
from the process.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated herein, and in Season's original
petition to consolidate, Season requests that the Department consolidate and
decide simultaneously the AIG Form A proceedings and the Season Form A
proceedings.
MAIDA, GALLOWAY & NEAL, P.A.
By: /s/ Thomas J. Maida
------------------------------------
Thomas J. Maida
Florida Bar No. 275212
300 East Park Avenue
P.O. Box 1819
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Of counsel:
Stephen T. Maher
Shutts & Bowen
1500 Miami Center
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131
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